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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED SOCIAL NORMS
ON ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT
by
Kathleen P. Bauman
University of New Hampshire, May, 1997

This paper examined the role of perceived social norms in relation to people's
attitudes and behavioral intentions, specifically in regards to the false consensus effect
(FCE). People are prone to numerous biases in judgments about peers’ beliefs,
including overestimating support for their own position (i.e., false consensus). These
misperceptions can then shape people's beliefs and guide their behavior. This series of
studies assessed the influence of this type of misperception on attitudes and behavioral
intentions regarding controversial social issues. Study 1 demonstrated that people
displayed false consensus for current social issues. Alterations in wording and order of
presentation did not affect the findings. Study 2 showed that this bias subsequently
predicts behavioral intentions in a modified test of the theory of reasoned action. Study
3 reduced the false consensus effect by exposing participants to information supporting
both sides of social issues. Recommendations for interventions that effectively change
and promote beneficial social norms are discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Social norms exert powerful influences on individuals, an observation which was
clearly demonstrated by Asch's (1955) seminal work on conformity. Consequently,
people's behavior is often constrained or shaped by norms adopted by their peer groups.
Social norms are defined as rules and expectations for behavior in the group (Taylor,
Peplau, & Sears, 1994). For many attitudinal issues, there are no objectively correct
answers, so norms are derived from judgments of people's behavior. Basing this source
of knowledge on observations or conversations with close friends can be potentially
harmful because erroneous estimates can give individuals a biased perspective on the
world.
People tend to overestimate support for their beliefs relative to people who hold
different views (see review by Mullen, Atkins, Champion, Edwards, Hardy, Story, &
Vanderklok (1 9 85 )). Ross, Greene, and House (1977) referred to this tendency as the
false consensus effect (FCE). Another study that examined norms about alcohol use on
college campuses demonstrated that typical students engaged in drinking behavior with
which they were personally uncomfortable because they perceived the norms to be
supportive of excessive drinking (Prentice & Miller, 19 93 ). Obviously, this
inaccurate assessment of norms is problematic and can lead to negative outcomes.
Consequently, it is important to study the potential influences of social norms on
behavior. Therefore, this set of studies will address the development of social norms and
their impact on social behavior, specifically in regards to the false consensus bias.
Several key assumptions related to norm perception must be reviewed. First, it
is important to show that people do in fact base their behavior and attitudes on social
norms. Next, it is necessary to examine how people come to understand social norms.
Research suggests that people have some difficulty estimating dispersion in social
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distributions because they are prone to several systematic biases (Funder, 1987;
Nisbett & Kunda, 1985), including false consensus. Finally, it is necessary to
determine if these misperceptions can influence people's behavior. These
misperceptions will be discussed specifically in relation to Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975)
theory of reasoned action. According to this theory, volitional behavior is a function of
one's behavioral intentions which are produced by attitudes toward the behavior and
subjective norms toward performing that behavior. Consequently, people's
interpretations of social norms might incorrectly bias their responses and subsequent
behavior.
Social Influence
Although a substantial body of psychological research has examined the influence
of social norms, it has been limited mostly to the laboratory. The classic social
influence studies conducted by Asch (1955) and Sherif (1 9 3 6 ) utilized norms that
were created as part of the experiment. Solomon Asch (1 9 55 ) was specifically
interested in how social forces shaped people's opinions and attitudes. On the basis of
early social psychological research which suggested that people were easily swayed by
persuasion and guided by public opinion, Asch questioned the stability of individuals'
attitudes. He believed that people were less susceptible to group pressures than earlier
research suggested. Consequently, he conducted a series of studies to test people's
willingness to conform to the prescribed social norm. Participants were informed that
they were involved in a study testing visual judgment in which they would be asked to
compare a standard line to three comparison lines. In the standard paradigm, a single
subject was introduced into a group containing seven to nine confederates. The
experiment was designed so that each group member publicly selected the matching line
with the stipulation that the actual subject always responded after the majority of the
participants had stated their answers. Overall, Asch found that subjects conformed by
choosing the incorrect option selected by the confederates on 37% of the trials. In these
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experiments, participants followed the norms established by the group in about one
third of the trials, even though the correct answer was clearly apparent (i.e., control
subjects made errors on this task in less than one percent of the trials). The power of
these socially dictated norms was most strikingly demonstrated when subjects chose a
line that was as much as seven inches longer than the target (Asch, 1955).
Sherif s (1 9 3 6 ) earlier research demonstrated that this type of normative
influence continued even after subjects had been removed from the group setting. He
asked subjects to judge the distance that a pinpoint of light moved in a darkened room. In
actuality, the light did not move as the illusion is due to the autokinetic effect (which
occurs because the visual system cannot adjust for minor movements of the eye without a
frame of reference), so this stimulus provided more latitude for different
interpretations. He believed that people prefer to have consensus rather than
disagreement in most social situations. Consequently, people are willing to change their
own beliefs or behavior to produce agreement. When people were placed in this situation
alone, they developed their own individual standards forjudging the movement of the
light. But when Sherif asked people to state their judgments aloud in a group setting, the
individual estimates converged with the other subjects. Furthermore, subjects
continued to use the standard that had emerged in the group when they made subsequent
estimates alone. Therefore, his research demonstrated the powerful effects of socially
established norms.
This type of responding can be attributed to several types of influence, including
informational, normative, and interpersonal (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Informational
influence occurs when people seek information from peers in uncertain situations. In
Sherif s study, the subjects lacked any actual external standard (i.e., there was no right
answer). Therefore, they used information from the other subjects to help guide their
judgments. Normative influence occurs when people change their actions to fit the social
norms of the situation. Basically, this type of influence helps people decide what is the
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socially appropriate way to respond in a particular situation. Sherif showed that
subjects in his experiment were also susceptible to normative influences. He discovered
that people continued to rely on the group answer even when they left the room
suggesting that they were still being influenced by social norms. Last, interpersonal
influence refers to social responses that selectively encourage conformity and discourage
or punish nonconformity. This factor was especially strong in Asch's research because
participants experienced strong social pressure to conform to the group.
While this experimental research was paramount in studying the influence of
social norms, these findings did not extend beyond the confines of the laboratory setting.
Therefore, it seems important to study the development of social norms in a more
naturalistic setting. In a classic study of political attitudes, Newcomb (1943)
documented the shifts in beliefs at Bennington College. Most of the students during that
time came from relatively conservative families, so freshmen tended to express
conservative attitudes. The graduating class usually possessed rather liberal attitudes.
Newcomb reasoned that students acquired new attitudes from their classmates and the
college faculty through a social learning process. Although they initially held
conservative values, observation of other students and professors shifted their attitudes
toward more liberal beliefs, especially if they associated with other liberal students.
Newcomb also observed that individuals who were family oriented and did not take part
in campus events tended to remain conservative. Finally, he noted that these beliefs
tended to remain stable over the lifespan after the college experience. Clearly, this
study demonstrates the powerful influence that social norms can exert, but how was this
information conveyed to the students? Newcomb's research did not specifically address
the process by which students came to perceive the liberal tendencies on campus.
An ethnographic study of adolescent Scottish boys' views about sex offers some
insight into the development of social norms (Wight, 1994). This study showed that
boys get most of their information about sexual roles and norms from friends, followed
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by television and parents. Television seems to provide role models and social scripts,
while parents more frequently give factual information about sexually transmitted
disease and birth control. However, the bulk of the boys' information was derived from
conversations with friends. On average, though, the boys were reluctant to appear
inexperienced or uninformed, so they went to great lengths to mask their lack of
knowledge, which has some interesting consequences. Because of the inherent taboo
surrounding frank discussions of sexuality, most boys found it difficult to get honest
answers or information. Additionally, they tended to make up or embellish stories in
order to appear 'macho' to their friends. One boy stated that "You exaggerate. Probably
nearly everyone does, you know” (Wight, 1994, p. 721). Both of these factors led to
inaccurate beliefs about the norms being repeated and perpetrated. In fact, the author
stated that "to avoid ridicule, the boys not only conform to a conventional and rather
restricted norm of masculinity, but..., they actively affirm and reproduce this norm to
avoid being targeted for jibes” (Wight, 1994, p. 720).

The author also noted that

there was a large discrepancy between what the boys were willing to admit in private
discussions compared to group sessions. It seems that their personal behavior was quite
different from the image they typically presented to their peers, which led to a
persistent misconception of appropriate sexual norms.
Other cross-cultural studies have examined the development of social and
cultural norms. Flynn (1 9 94 ) conducted a study on attitudes toward corporal
punishment. The author cited Sweden as a liberal country that enacted legislation to
outlaw physical punishment. Although there was no penalty for spanking children, the
government hoped to create a cultural norm prohibiting this type of punishment. Using
a similar technique, many American schools have eliminated corporal punishment from
schools in an effort to force parents to question the valge of this technique. These
administrators are hoping to create a climate in which spanking becomes less normative
(Flynn, 1994). Obviously, these techniques rest on the assumption that changing
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normative beliefs in the population can have a profound effect on behavior. These studies
also reinforce the idea that people look to their peers in order to determine the norms of
the group. Festinger's social comparison research offers some insight on how this
process works.
Social Comparison
Festinger (1 9 54 ) originally discussed social comparison as a means of
establishing social norms when no objective criteria existed. He stated that individuals
evaluate their opinions and abilities based on other people. In other words, they use
other people to ensure that their beliefs conform to social norms and to confirm their
perceptions of social reality. Festinger elucidated a number of hypotheses about the
social comparison process. First, he stated that people possess a drive to evaluate their
opinions and abilities. Second, he hypothesized that people would evaluate their opinions
and abilities by comparison with others, only when objective, non-social means were
not available. Third, social comparison decreases when the differences between the
comparison groups increases. In other words, people do not use dissimilar people as
reference groups. Additionally, he stated that any factors which increase the importance
of a particular group would strengthen their role as a comparison group and increase
conformity. Based on these premises, a number of assertions can be made. First,
attitudes about social issues clearly do not have objective criteria. Furthermore, college
students most likely rely on their peers as a reference group. Thus, estimates of peers'
beliefs are probably strong determinants of people's perceptions of the social norms on
campus. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the source of students’ norms, which is
one of the goals of this project. Festinger's theory has broad ranging applications,
particularly for psychologists attempting to understand and measure people's opinions
or attitudes (see also Suls and Wills, 1991; Wood, 1989).
While Festinger's research suggests that people are motivated to seek
confirmation from their peers, other research has shown that people have difficulty
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correctly performing this task (Nisbett & Kunda, 1985). By presenting subjects with a
number of issues and asking them to estimate the distribution of people across a 10point scale, the researchers concluded that people have some difficulty accurately
estimating social norms concerning a range of attitudinal issues and behaviors (e.g.,
defense spending and going to concerts). Furthermore, they found that people make
systematic errors when attempting to judge their peer's beliefs, including pluralistic
ignorance, false consensus, and false uniqueness.
Biases
Pluralistic Ignorance
One bias which leads people to make inaccurate assessments about people's
attitudes is pluralistic ignorance which occurs when people publicly display similar
beliefs and behaviors, while holding different underlying attitudes (Prentice & Miller,
1993). Miller and Prentice (1994) have recently outlined three ways in which
pluralistic ignorance can develop. First, it can reflect a public norm enforced by a vocal
minority, such as a religious group. Second, it may represent an idealized norm, rather
than accurate individual beliefs. Finally, it can derive from an outdated public norm
which continues to exert influence even though it has lost private support (e.g., racial
desegregation).
The term was first used in 1924 by Floyd Allport who defined pluralistic
ignorance as a "situation in which virtually all members of a group privately reject
group norms yet believe that virtually all other group members accept them" (Miller &
McFarland, 1987, p. 298). Fifty years later, this concept was reformulated by Latane
and Darley (1 9 70 ) as an explanation for the bystander effect. They reasoned that
people's failure to respond to an emergency was due in part to the audience's uncertainty
about an ambiguous situation. So, the members look to other people who are presumably
undergoing the same decision-making process, but outwardly they are all maintaining a
calm facade. Based on this information, people do not construe the situation as an
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emergency which leads to bystander apathy. Although pluralistic ignorance served as an
explanation in this research, it has not received much empirical research as an
independent area of study.
Miller and McFarland (1 9 87 ) conducted one of the first experiments to explain
pluralistic ignorance. They observed that students are often very reluctant to ask
questions in class, so they reasoned that people behave similarly but individuals believe
that their behavior is shaped by different forces than their peers. Thus, they
hypothesized that people believe that a fear of embarrassment is sufficient cause to deter
their behavior, while other people's inaction must be due to different reasons. In other
words, students do not ask questions about difficult concepts because they are afraid of
appearing unintelligent, but they believe that their classmates refrain from asking
questions because they have a solid grasp of the material. In a series of studies, they
concluded that people do demonstrate pluralistic ignorance concerning the origins of
behavior. First, they presented subjects with a number of different traits and asked
them to estimate the prevalence of these characteristics for themselves and their peers.
As predicted, they found that participants believed that they possessed more
characteristics that result in social inhibition (e.g., inhibited, self-conscious, and
hesitant) than their peers. In the remaining three studies, they obtained ratings from
subjects about their likelihood to engage in either actual or hypothetical embarrassing
situations. Then, they compared these scores to their estimates and explanations for
their peers' behavior. In all of the studies, they found that subjects overestimated the
number of other students who would engage in the embarrassing act (e.g., ask for help in
interpreting a purposefully vague journal article) and inaccurately reported the
reasoning for these behaviors (e.g., the other students did not ask for help because they
actually understood the article).
Another recent study by Prentice and Miller (1 9 9 3 ) examined social norms
concerning alcohol use at universities. Although underage drinking is the norm on most
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college campuses, the authors argued that most students only publicly conform to this
standard, but privately hold conflicting beliefs. In a series of interviews, they asked
students about their alcohol usage and their estimates of their peers' drinking habits.
All of the findings supported the pluralistic ignorance hypothesis; subjects believed that
they were more uncomfortable with drinking on campus than their peers and their
friends. Furthermore, they found that males were more likely to shift their private
attitudes towards the perceived group norms in order to avoid feeling deviant. In this
case, misperception of the social norm is clearly affecting behavior and could have
dangerous ramifications.
Pluralistic ignorance has been related to various other social concerns. The
inability to assess people's private attitudes can lead people to incorrectly perceive
support for their behaviors. For example, researchers have shown that pluralistic
ignorance has been used as an explanation for racial segregation (O'Gorman, 1975).
This phenomenon has also been related to opinions concerning environmental issues
(Taylor, 1982) and parolees' perception of the justice system, such that ex-offenders
underestimate the extent of police harassment (Berman, 1976). In general, this
research suggests that people do in fact misinterpret underlying private attitudes which
may bias their own personal behavior.
False Consensus
People may also attem pt to validate their beliefs by projecting (see Holmes,
1968) their own characteristics onto other individuals, which has been demonstrated by
the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). Based on the attribution
literature, this theory states that people tend to overestimate the degree of similarity
between themselves and their peers relative to people who hold an opposing view. More
specifically, people who support a given position, such as abortion, would believe that
more people are in favor of this position, while people who are opposed (e.g., pro-life)
would estimate that fewer people agree with abortion.
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In the original test of this theory, subjects were presented with a series of
vignettes followed by two behavioral options (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). For
example, in one scenario, people were interviewed at a grocery store and asked if their
responses could be used for a television commercial. Subjects were asked to indicate
what percentage of their peers would engage in each choice (e.g., would sign the release
for the TV station or would refuse to sign the release). Following these ratings, they
selected which outcome they would be most likely to choose. In support of the
hypothesis, subjects who picked a particular option rated that response as more common
in people in general. In other words, people who would sign the release predicted that
76% of the general population would also sign the release. However, people who refused
this request believed that only 57% of the population would agree to such a request. To
extend the findings, a second study was conducted which presented a number of different
categories, such as personal traits and views (e.g., competitive), personal preferences
(e.g., brown bread versus white bread), political expectations (e.g., women in Supreme
Court within decade) and personal characteristics (e.g., first born). Findings from most
of the categories supported the false consensus hypothesis which consequently extended
its domain. The final two studies utilized actual behavioral measures to assess the
generalizability of the findings, which provided additional support for the false
consensus theory. People who agreed to a particular behavior (e.g., wear a sign) were
more likely to believe that others would also engage in such an act. The authors
concluded that false consensus is a robust effect evidenced by the generality across topics
(c.f., van der Pligt, 1984) and the behavioral data.
A meta-analysis conducted by Mullen and his colleagues (1985) supported the
original conclusions. In 115 tests of the false consensus hypothesis, Mullen et al.
concluded that it is a statistically significant finding with a moderate effect size.
Detailed analyses of the studies suggested that the effect is not influenced by the type of
reference population (e.g., peers versus the general population). However, the number
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of behavioral estimates and the order of presentation did influence the findings. More
specifically, fewer options and peer estimates made prior to the self ratings were shown
to produce larger effect sizes. In general, this finding is quite robust and welldocumented, suggesting that people's estimates of social norms may be systematically
biased in the direction of support for their own beliefs. Not all of the research supports
this finding though.
False Uniqueness
Researchers (e.g., McFarland & Miller, 1990; Suls & Wan, 1987) have
reported occasionally that there was also a false uniqueness effect, which is defined as a
systematic underestimation of self-other similarity. This finding has been shown in
diverse areas. For example, people believe that they are happier, more intelligent, and
less prejudiced than others (McFarland & Miller, 1990). These findings suggest that
false uniqueness occurs when the traits or characteristics are positive in nature,
because possessing more or less of these traits is advantageous or socially desirable.
Based on a survey of psychological fears, Suls and Wan (1 9 87 ) found that
subjects with high fear ratings overestimated the number of other subjects who also
possessed similar phobias, thus demonstrating false consensus. However, subjects who
were less afraid, tended to underestimate the absence of fear among their peers,
suggesting that false uniqueness was occurring. Based on their research, it appears that
both false uniqueness and false consensus can appear depending on which produces more
desirable outcomes. Marks (1 9 84 ) demonstrated that people believe that their abilities
are unique (e.g., they are the best basketball player), but their opinions are common
(e.g., most people support Ross Perot).

However, Valins and Nisbett (1 9 72 ) described

the experience of new soldiers sent to Vietnam who felt isolated and afraid, because they
believed that no one else shared their fears. In this case, feeling unique caused these
soldiers a great deal of distress. Clearly, different motivational strategies underlie
these results.
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Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that both false uniqueness and false
consensus can occur simultaneously depending on the type of measurement used.
McFarland and Miller (1 9 9 0 ) described two aversive psychological experiments to
their subjects; the first involved a potentially embarrassing situation and the second
concerned viewing some unpleasant film clips of medical procedures. After hearing the
descriptions, they asked the subjects to choose the experiment in which they would least
prefer to participate. Subjects were also asked to indicate the percentage of other
students who would make the same selection. Last, they were asked to rate on a 9-point
Likert scale their degree of discomfort and how uncomfortable the average student would
be if they participated in the more aversive study. Results showed that false consensus
did occur in the percentage ratings; subjects overestimated the number of fellow
students who would make the same choice. However, a false uniqueness effect was found
when examining the ratings. Individuals believed that they would be more uncomfortable
than their peers. Therefore, the type of information sought has been shown to influence
people's expectations.
In order to discriminate between the three different types of biases, it is
important to understand their similarities and differences. False consensus and
uniqueness both refer to inaccurate estimates of peer support; however, when false
consensus occurs, people overestimate support, but when false uniqueness is found,
people underestimate the percentage of peers who share their position relative to
individuals who hold the opposing position. Pluralistic ignorance simply refers to a
tendency to inaccurately identify the majority's beliefs based on manifested behavior. In
cases when a group of people are outwardly acting in a similar manner, pluralistic
ignorance takes place when each individual believes that they are behaving in that
manner for a different reason than the other group members. Therefore, pluralistic
ignorance refers to a false belief based on observations of overt behavior. False
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consensus and uniqueness can refer to behaviors, but also include personality traits and
attitudes.
Explanations
Several explanations have been generated to explain these seemingly
contradictory findings. Clearly, people do not possess accurate information about
people's beliefs. Previous research has demonstrated that people have difficulty
correctly identifying dispersion in social distributions (Nisbett & Kunda, 1985).
However, this explanation could result in false uniqueness or false consensus depending
on which direction people tend to err. Consequently, it is important to understand what
causes people to overestimate or underestimate support for their position.
Numerous cognitive explanations have been proposed for these findings. In these
cases, people are not consciously altering their perceptions, but they are making an
error in judgment. Often, selective exposure may account for their inaccurate estimates
(Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). People tend to associate with similar others, thus
reinforcing the idea that their beliefs are relatively common. Additionally, the
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) suggests that people overestimate
support for their position because they are basing their judgment on a limited sample of
similar individuals which is recalled more easily when people are asked to make
judgments about their peers. On the other hand, if people believe that they are a
minority in a given population, the availability heuristic might lead to an
underestimation of support. For example, if a person is pro-choice at a strict Catholic
school, he or she may feel that he or she is the only person to hold such a belief, which
could lead to false uniqueness. Furthermore, based on pluralistic ignorance, people may
outwardly demonstrate similar behaviors while holding different private attitudes (e.g.,
they may all attend Sunday mass, while still believing abortion is acceptable).
The salience or the focus of the issue may also distort consensus beliefs (Marks &
Miller, 1987). In other words, if the subjects are primed to think about their
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particular viewpoint, it is easy to reason that they would increase consensus for that
position. On the other hand, if they are asked to focus on both sides of an issue, it may
decrease the likelihood of false consensus. Last, people may attribute their behavior or
beliefs to situational forces and believe that others are similarly affected by these
factors, thus causing false consensus (Giiovich, Jennings, & Jennings, 1983).
However, according to the actor-observer effect (Jones & Davis, 1965), people tend to
attribute other people's behavior to dispositional causes which might invoke false
uniqueness.
Sherman, Chassin, Presson, and Agostinelli (1984) attempted to address the
underlying cognitive basis for the false consensus effect. They generated two predictions
based on cognitive consistency theory: the similarity principle and the evaluation
principle. The similarity principle argues that people believe that similar others
possess similar characteristics. Therefore, the false consensus effect is reflecting
direct projection of traits by individuals onto their peers. On the other hand, the
evaluation principle explanation assumes that people are making stereotypical
judgments about other positive individuals by judging that these people possess positive
characteristics (e.g., “what is beautiful is good stereotype”; Dion, Berscheid, &
Walster, 1972)). The fact that the FCE seems to be reflecting projection is a by
product of the fact that people also assume that they too possess desirable qualities.
Sherman et al. (1984) argued that these types of influence would function
differently based on the topic being judged. Issues for which all people would agree that
one dimension is good or bad (e.g., kindness) or that neither dimension is preferable
(e.g., salt versus pepper) are labeled universally evaluated qualities. On the other hand,
topics for which people disagree about the desirability of the traits are considered
variably evaluated qualities (e.g., capital punishment). A series of studies showed that
people are generally using the evaluation principle, as larger false consensus effects
were produced on variably rated issues. If similarity were being evoked, the effects
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would be found on both universal and variably rated topics (Sherman e t al., 1984).
Thus, people are not directly projecting their own qualities onto peers, which suggests
that people’s beliefs (i.e., attitudes) might not correlate highly with their false
consensus estimates.
Another study attempted to determine the basis of the false consensus effect by
comparing social projection to social conformity (Marks, Graham, & Hansen, 1992).
Social projection assumes that people are basing their estimates on their personal
attitudes, while social comparison suggests that people are basing their attitudes on
their perceptions of their peers. The fact that studies that ask peers to give consensus
estimates before they describe their endorsement show larger effect sizes for the false
consensus effect lends some support to the social comparison explanation. In an attempt
to establish which method has a greater impact on people’s perceptions, Marks, Graham,
and Hansen (1992) measured adolescent alcohol use over the course of a year (from the
start of seventh grade through eighth grade). Students were asked a series of questions
including their personal alcohol usage and their estimates of peer alcohol use. While
they found a slightly stronger effect for social conformity, they reasoned that both
accounts probably contribute to adolescents’ decision to use alcohol. Furthermore, their
theory takes both cognitive and motivational limitations into consideration.
Other researchers have espoused motivational explanations. Marks, Miller, and
Maruyama (1981) have shown that people perceive more similarity between
themselves and physically attractive individuals. Additionally, people displayed a larger
FCE when they anticipate meeting a target individual in the future (Miller & Marks,
1982). According to social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), people need to
justify ambiguous opinions and abilities by comparing themselves to peers. Thus,
overestimating consensus can increase people's self-esteem by providing support for
their beliefs. It also serves an ego-defensive function (Katz, 1960) when people
perceive their positive characteristics or desired attitudes as rare and their negative
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traits as prevalent Viewing negative traits or outcomes as relatively common may also
help to reduce anxiety about deviance. Campbell (1986) found that people
overestimated support for their opinions, but underestimated consensus for their
abilities, suggesting that inaccurately perceiving consensus can serve to protect the ego
by enhancing positive traits and bolster self-esteem by providing support for attitudes.
As evidence of this motivational drive, under conditions of failure, people are especially
likely to commit the false consensus bias (Sherman, Presson, & Chassin, 1984).
A second motivational explanation is the desire to be unique, in which individuals
want to be distinctive from their peers (Fromkin, 1972; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980).
These psychologists stress people's need for independence and a unique self-image. If
this need is aroused, it can lead to perceptions of false uniqueness. Furthermore,
portraying oneself as different from peers may bolster one's self-esteem. Keams
(1 9 84 ) examined the role of this desire for uniqueness and found that individual
differences in the need for uniqueness did affect the false consensus effect Consequently,
this drive may influence some subjects' responses relative to their more conforming
peers.
A final explanation stems from pluralistic ignorance by which people view a
particular behavior as relatively common and therefore acceptable (Sherman, Presson,
Chassin, Corty, & Olshavsky, 1 9 83 ). In other words, individuals may attempt to match
their behavior to a perceived majority's actions. Therefore, they overestimate the
relative frequency of a particular attitude on the basis of people’s actions. The problem
lies in the fact that the behavior is not an accurate reflection of the underlying attitude
(see Prentice & Miller, 1983).
All of the alternative theories offer possible explanations for distortions in
judgments of consensus. However, few researchers have attempted to determine if
cognitive or motivational factors have a greater impact on false consensus beliefs.
Sherman, Presson, Chassin, Corty, and Olshavsky (1983) conducted a study to
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determine the underlying mechanism of false consensus. They divided the possible
causes into four categories: selective exposure, motivation distortions, causal
attribution, and behavioral (social) conformity. Overall, they found that adolescents
were more prone to false consensus than adults and selective exposure was the best
predictor. Therefore, this set of studies will attempt to provide a measure of the
inaccuracies of judgment and an explanation for these perceptions.
Summary
Thus far, it has been demonstrated that people are influenced by social norms
(e.g., Asch and Newcomb). Furthermore, the research conducted on pluralistic
ignorance, false consensus, and false uniqueness supports Nisbett and Kunda's (1985)
assertion that people make systematic errors in interpreting the social norms.
Therefore, it is important to establish direct links between social norms and behavior in
order to conclude that misperceptions can have consequences for behavior. Fishbein and
Ajzen's (1 9 7 5 ) theory of reasoned action provides solid evidence that social norms do in
fact mediate behavior.
Theory of Reasoned Action
As stated earlier, the theory of reasoned action states that behavior can be
predicted from behavioral intentions which in turn are a function of attitudes toward the
behavior and subjective norms. Ajzen (1988) defined subjective norms as “the
person's perception of social pressure to perform or not perform the behavior under
consideration” (p. 117). Subjective norms consist of two components: normative
beliefs (i.e., beliefs concerning how important others [referents] want an individual to
behave) and motivation to comply (with these referents) (Fishbein, 1979). Thus,
subjective norms typically arise from perceptions of friends' and family members'
beliefs. They are experimentally assessed by asking respondents to judge their
perceptions of various groups' approval for a particular behavior.
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In a standard test of this theory, multiple regression analyses are conducted in
which attitudes and subjective norms are entered as predictor variables. In a series of
studies conducted by Ajzen, Fishbein, and their colleagues (1 9 8 0 ), they found both
predictors (i.e., attitudes and norms) to be significant in explaining the use of birth
control pills, breast feeding, church attendance, the decision to have an abortion or
another child, voting behavior, and the likelihood of entering an alcohol treatment
center. While attitudes explained a larger percentage of the variance in most of these
areas, norms were found to be more important predictors in the decision to have an
abortion or another child. These findings make sense in light of the role that referents
would play in these types of decisions.
Van den Putte's (1991) meta-analysis of 113 studies demonstrated that
behavioral intentions were strongly predicted by attitudes and subjective norms.
Furthermore, intentions were also significantly related to actual behavior. Additional
research has emphasized the importance of studying subjective norms in relation to a
number of social issues, so studies which addressed the importance of norms will be
discussed.
In a study that examined driving behavior, Stasson and Fishbein (1990) found
that subjective norms were highly predictive of people's intentions to wear seat belts
under dangerous driving conditions, while attitudes were a better predictor when
conditions were safe. Another study conducted by Parker, Manstead, and Stradling
(1995) confirmed the importance of social norms in relation to driving violations,
including cutting across traffic to exit a highway, consistently changing lanes in slowmoving traffic, and overtaking on the inside. Additionally, they considered the
differential impact of moral (personal) norms versus social norms. They defined
personal norms as "an individual's internalized moral rules" and social norms as "an
individual's perceptions about what others would want him or her to do" (Parker,
Manstead, & Stradling, 1995, p. 129). Both types of norms were found to be significant
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predictors of intention to engage in these risky behaviors. This research seems to
suggest that people are more influenced by normative pressure in ambiguous situations,
which is supported by social comparison research (Festinger, 1954). Furthermore,
ambiguous situations might not be frequently discussed, so people are forced to rely on
observations in order to derive the appropriate social norms.
This idea was supported by Cummings and Comey's (1987) paper on gambling
behavior. They attempted to use the theory of reasoned action as a model for explaining
various gambling activities. Based on this theory, the researchers argued that intention
to gamble would be based on attitudes toward gambling and subjective norms regarding
this activity, as well as personality and demographic characteristics. They
conceptualized subjective norms by assessing normative beliefs (e.g., "My church
thinks I should go to Las Vegas to gamble on my next vacation") and motivation to comply
with these beliefs (e.g., "Generally speaking, I do what the church expects of me"). It is
interesting to note that they suggested that people's normative beliefs may not accurately
represent the true beliefs of their reference groups, but their perceptions guide
behavior.
The fact that perceptions rather than reality direct behavior is particularly
relevant when considering dangerous behaviors which are strongly influenced by peer
pressure, such as drinking and drug abuse. Laflin, Moore-Hirschi, Weis, and Hayes
(1994) examined the influence of subjective norms on high school and college students'
drug use behavior. They utilized questions which tapped subjective norms including
items such as "Drug abuse is a serious social problem." They found a high positive
correlation between drug attitudes and subjective norms, suggesting that personal
acceptance of drug use is highly related to a tendency to perceive permissive social
norms for engaging in illegal drug use. Furthermore, subjective norms were found to be
highly predictive of drug and alcohol use. Wilks, Callan, and Austin (1 9 8 9 ) specifically
examined the influence of various groups on adolescent drinking. They concluded that
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fathers' actual alcohol use and perceptions of friends' drinking habits were highly
predictive of both boys' and girls' drinking practices. However, females were less
influenced by norms as their drinking was related more to personal attitudes.
Nonetheless, the influence of the peer group cannot be underestimated at this critical
period in adolescents' lives.
Much of the research examining the theory of reasoned action deals with safe sex
practices. Terry, Gailigan, and Conway (1 9 93 ) examined people's likelihood to engage
in a variety of different strategies, including engaging in an exclusive sexual
relationship, avoiding casual sex, and asking sexual partners about their previous
sexual experience and drug use history. Their findings suggested that norms do play an
important role in influencing sexual practices, especially in regards to interactions
with casual partners (c.f., Morrison, Gillmore & Baker, 1995). In particular, they
concluded that peer support was especially relevant in curtailing promiscuous behavior
(i.e., having sexual relations with many partners). Therefore, they recommended that
intervention programs should focus on encouraging peer support for safer sexual
practices. Numerous other researchers have documented the conclusion that subjective
norms are predictive of intentions to engage in safe sexual behaviors (Chan & Fishbein,
1993; Gallois, Terry, & Timmons, 1994;

Morrison, Gillmore, & Baker, 1995;

Tashakkori & Thompson, 1992; White, Terry, & Hogg, 1994).
Ross and McLaws (1992) demonstrated that subjective norms about condom
usage were better predictors of actual usage than attitudes for 173 homosexual males.
While past behavior was also shown to be an important factor, personal attitudes were
only weakly related to behavior. Therefore, the authors concluded that peer-based
education would be more effective in combating dangerous sexual practices than changing
attitudes toward the use of precautions.
These findings have been employed by researchers attempting to develop effective
mass-media campaigns directed at preventing AIDS. Fishbein and his colleagues
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(1 993a; 1993b) conducted a longitudinal study comparing AIDS knowledge, beliefs, and
practices in several Caribbean countries. By measuring residents' knowledge, risk
perceptions, and attitudes toward AIDS-protective behavior, they were able to determine
what factors should be emphasized in a campaign directed at these countries. Based on
the theory of reasoned action, one specific goal was to increase normative pressure
concerning condom use. Two categories of normative questions were posed: behavioral
norms and normative beliefs. To assess behavioral norms, participants were asked
several questions tapping the role that their friends and sexual partners played in
influencing condom usage (e.g., "Do you and your friends ever talk about using
condoms?"). As a measure of normative beliefs, subjects were asked to indicate the
level of influence of three reference groups: parents, sexual partners, and close friends.
The researchers concluded that the campaign was successful in increasing the normative
belief that potential dating partners supported the use of condoms. Furthermore, they
stated that "the data clearly indicated that perceived normative pressure was a key
determinant of condom use in these populations" (Middlestadt et al., 1995, p. 22).
Specifically, personal condom use was predicted from beliefs about friends' acceptance of
this practice obtained through conversation about sexual topics.
Trafimow (1994) more closely examined the influence of normative pressure in
regard to condom use. He cited findings from the longitudinal study conducted in the
Caribbean as evidence that subjective norms were the best predictor of safe sexual
practices.

However, norms still only explained approximately 34% of the variance in

people's behaviors, so he argued that another important factor had been overlooked in the
analyses. He believed that this factor was confidence in the correctness of norm
perception (i.e., how certain are people in their judgments of sexual partners’ beliefs).
Consequently, he examined the influence of certainty and found that confidence in norm
judgment mediated behavioral intentions. College students rated the likelihood of condom
use in hypothetical scenarios where their partner's desire was sure or unsure. They

21

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

also rated their own attitudes about condom use, normative pressure to use condoms, and
confidence in perceptions of partner's preferences. He found significant differences in
people's likelihood to use a condom based on their certainty ratings of their partner's
preferences. Furthermore, he concluded that "intentions to use condoms seem to be
driven more by perceptions of normative pressure than by attitudes" (Trafimow, 1994,
p. 2157), especially for extremely confident subjects. Trafimow also addressed the
source of high levels of confidence in perceptions related to sexual practices. He
concluded that people's certainty is probably derived from experience or based on
individual differences in person perception (e.g., people with high self-esteem simply
perceive themselves as good intuiters of people's beliefs). While these explanations may
account for varying levels of certainty, they still do not directly address the source or
the accuracy of the norms. However, it does emphasize the fact that confident people are
probably likely to base their behavior on their perceptions, even if they are not
reflective of peers' beliefs.
In related research, Kelly and his colleagues (1991, 1992) examined the
importance of social norms in relation to high-risk homosexual behavior. In order to
effectively eliminate this type of behavior, Kelly trained leaders in the gay community
to endorse safer sexual practices. This technique was based on the premise that high
status individuals within these communities would be able to alter the normative
standards for behavior. They successfully reduced the level of high-risk behavior by
approximately 25%, which demonstrated that modifying social norms can be helpful in
changing behavior.
Conclusion
Evidence from the numerous studies on the theory of reasoned action suggest that
subjective norms play an important role in predicting behavior. However, White,
Terry, and Hogg (1994) found that group norms were also predictive of intentions to
use a condom. In their study of sexually active undergraduates, they included a measure
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of group norms (the extent to which the behavior is judged to be normatively
appropriate) as well as subjective norms. They reasoned th at group norms might be
more important in situations in which referents do not have clearly expressed
expectations regarding particular behaviors. Therefore, future research should include
an assessment of group norms when studying socially sensitive issues which may not be
openly discussed. Additionally, it is equally important to consider the source and
accuracy of these norms.
In closing, these findings are encouraging because they suggest that it is possible
to reduce the frequency of dangerous behavior by changing people's perceptions of the
norms. Therefore, research in this area should be expanded to include intervention
techniques aimed at restructuring people's subjective norms, including beliefs
concerning driving, drug use, and sexual behavior. This set of studies was designed to
measure the source of norms for social issues and the role of misperceptions, namely the
false consensus bias, on socially relevant behavior. In the final study, the
misperceptions were addressed, so potentially dangerous behaviors can be prevented.
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II. STUDY 1

A preliminary study was conducted to determine if the false consensus effect
would be found in regard to social issues. A list of current controversial issues was
generated to serve as stimulus topics. Order and wording effects were also measured to
determine if variations in methodology influence this robust effect. Mullen, Driskell,
and Smith (1989) tested the effects of sequence of measurement and wording which were
hypothesized to affect this bias based on meta-analytic research (see Mullen et al.,
1985). They found that the false consensus effect was magnified when estimates were
made before endorsements and when estimates were made supporting their own position.
However, they used a single item measure (e.g., brown bread versus white bread),
unrelated to social issues, so it seemed important to see if these effects existed for this
type of topic.
Method
Subjects
One hundred and forty-five students (44 males and 101 females) from upper
level psychology courses volunteered to participate in the study. The subjects were
predominantly white Catholics with an average age of 19.65 years old (SD = 2.09).
Materials
A questionnaire was designed for this study which presented students with a
number of current controversial social issues (abortion, euthanasia, death penalty,
animal testing, legalization of drugs, the insanity plea, “gays in the military”, lower
drinking age, foreign aid, mandatory seat belt laws, ban on gun sales, ban on smoking in
public places, women in combat, immigration laws, condom distribution in high schools,
racial quotas, and prayer in schools). The questionnaire consisted of two sections: the
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subject's own position on each issue and an estimate of the percentage of peers who held a
particular position. Two variables were manipulated in this questionnaire: wording and
order. The effect of wording was measured by asking half of the subjects if they were
“in favor” of each subject and to estimate the percentage of peers who supported each
issue. The remaining subjects were asked if they were “opposed” to each issue and to
estimate the percentage of peers who were against each topic. Order was manipulated by
varying the order in which the self versus peer questionnaires were presented. Half of
the subjects were asked to give self reported positions first, while the other half gave
peer estimates followed by self-reported position information. In total, there were four
different combinations of questionnaires created.
Procedure
Participants were informed that they were taking part in a study on college
students' opinions about current social issues. They were told that their responses
would be kept completely anonymous; thus they should give honest answers. The
questionnaires were randomly distributed to each person during class. They were
instructed to read the information carefully and complete each item. After completing
the materials, the experiment was explained and the students were thanked for their
participation..
Results
It was hypothesized that people would display false consensus for the social issues
presented. First, the effects of order and wording were examined. In order to test these
predictions, 17 2 (order) x 2 (wording) x 2 (position) between groups MANOVAs were
conducted with the consensus estimates on each issue as the dependent measure. In
general, order and wording did not influence the false consensus effect, with the
following exceptions: there were significant effects of wording for abortion, the insanity
plea, women in combat, racial quotas, and prayer in schools, and a significant two way
interaction found for position by wording for gun control using the Bonferroni
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correction. The effects for position were unaffected by the inclusion of order and
wording. Additionally, there were no significant effects for order.
Because of the absence of consistent effects for these variables, the remaining
data was analyzed collapsing across order and wording. In order to calculate consensus
scores for people who asked to estimate the percentage of students who were opposed to
each issue, their estimates were subtracted from 100. This computation allowed all
participants’ scores to be compared on the same scale (i.e., what percentage of students
do they believe support each attitude). The means and standard deviations for estimates
for each issue are shown in Table 1. In order to determine if false consensus is present,
t-tests were conducted between the estimates given by subjects who supported and
opposed each issue. A FCE is indicated if there is a significant difference between the
groups. The t and b values are also presented in Table 1. Using a Bonferroni correction
of e < .003 to control for the number of comparisons, a false consensus effect was
evident for 11 of the 17 issues.

26

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 1

T-Test Analyses to Measure False Consensus Comparing Consensus Estimates Between
Participants Who Support or Oppose Various Social Issues
AGAINST

FOR
fSDl

TNI

Mean

fSDl

TNI

issues

Mean

Abortion

62.45(1 5 .4 3 )[1 0 4 ]

58.00(1 8 .4 8 )[3 4 ]

1.39

.167

Euthanasia

6 1 .2 8 (2 0 .3 0 )[9 9 ]

4 1 .0 9 ( 2 5 .7 5 )[3 4 ]

4.66

.0 0 0 **

Death penalty

56.57(1 7.44) [101 ]

5 1 .6 8 (2 2 .7 7 )[3 8 ]

1.20

.230

Animal testing

4 5 .3 7 ( 2 1 .0 3 )[5 3 ]

2 5 .7 2 ( 2 0 .2 2 )[8 7 ]

5.49

.0 0 0 **

Drugs legalized

72.72(1 5.21 )[6 0 ]

5 2 .6 5 (2 1 .0 9 )[8 2 ]

6.59

.0 0 0 **

Insanity plea

55.73(1 7 .9 4 )[6 4 ]

45.1 3(1 7 .3 0 )[71 ]

3.50

.0 0 1 **

Gays in the m ilitary60.42(20.83)[l 27]

46.20(1 7 .43)[1 5]

2.54

.0 1 2 *

Lower drinking age83.18 ( 1 8 .7 7 )[8 9 ]

6 5 .1 4 (2 3 .8 1 )[5 5 ]

5.05

.0 0 0 **

Foreign aid

61.42(1 9.31 )[9 9 ]

44.30(1 6 .8 8 )[3 7 ]

4.76

.0 0 0 * *

Mandatory
seatbelt laws

6 4 .5 4 (2 5 .4 6 ) [ 1 1 3]

4 4 .3 6 ( 2 5 .4 9 )[2 8 ]

3.75

.0 0 0 **

Ban on gun sales

5 8 .4 6 (2 1 .2 7 )[9 6 ]

5 2 .2 2 ( 2 1 .5 6 )[4 6 ]

1.63

.106

Ban on
public smoking

53.21 (2 2 .2 0 )[9 6 ]

4 4 .8 7 ( 2 6 .5 2 )[4 7 ]

1.98

.0 5 0 *

Women in combat 67.08 (1 8.13)[1 30]

3 8 .6 2 (2 3 .47)[1 3]

5.25

.0 0 0 **

Open immigration 56.03(1 8 .9 8 )[6 4 ]
laws

3 6 .3 4 (2 0 .7 8 ) [70]

5.71

.0 0 0 **

Condom
7 8 .7 4 ( 1 7 .3 4 )[1 32]
distribution in schools

60.50(1 9 .7 8 )[1 0 ]

3.18

.0 0 0 **

Racial quotas
for employment

42.31 (23.1 2 )[9 4 ]

2.26

.0 2 6 *

4.82

.0 0 0 **

5 1 .8 8 (2 2 .9 2 )[4 3 ]

Prayer in
29.46(1 8.7 5 ) [ 1 1 8]
4 9 .8 4 (2 1 .3 2 )[2 5 ]
public schools
* fi < .05.
** Significant with Bonferroni correction (fi<.003).

t
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p

Discussion
As hypothesized, people did show a significant false consensus effect for the
majority of issues. Furthermore, the effect was generally unaffected by slight
alterations in wording and order of presentation. Therefore, the more conservative
technique of asking for self endorsements first will be utilized in further studies.
Because it has been demonstrated that people show the false consensus effect for current
social issues, Study 2 describes its relation to behavioral intentions. Additionally,
information concerning students’ perceptions regarding the source of their beliefs is
discussed.
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III. STUDY 2

The previous study established that false consensus effects are consistent in
people's views about social issues. The goal of this study is to extend this research by
demonstrating that these biases are related to behavioral intentions. Research conducted
by Botvin, Botvin, Baker, Dusenbury, and Goldberg (1992) demonstrated clearly that
false consensus can affect behavior. In a study designed to predict tobacco use from
normative beliefs, it was found that students who gave higher estimates of the prevalence
of smoking were more likely to smoke or begin smoking. The researchers utilized a
cross-sectional and longitudinal design, which allowed them to establish the potential
effects of false consensus beliefs. They surveyed approximately one thousand adolescents
during seventh and ninth grade. At both times, subjects completed a measure of selfreported smoking and a questionnaire tapping normative expectations about smoking,
including estimates of peer and adult smoking prevalence. They concluded that students
who believed that at least 50% of peers or adults smoked were significantly more likely
to smoke. Furthermore, children in the seventh grade who did not smoke were more
likely to have started in the ninth grade if they overestimated the prevalence of smoking
among their peers. Overall, the researchers concluded that "adolescents tend to act in a
way consistent with perceived norms” (Botvin et al., 1992, p. 177).
In a related study, Chassin, Presson, Sherman, Corty, and Olshavsky(l 984)
found that normative beliefs were the best predictor of middle-school students’
likelihood to smoke. In this study, the authors attempted to predict smoking initiation at
several levels: proximal variables, which were measured using Ajzen and Fishbein's
model, distal variables, which were assessed using Jessor and Jessor's (1977) model,
and each subjects' smoking environment. Jessor and Jessor's model examines the role of
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personality variables and social support in adolescence. They argued that many
adolescent problems are simply premature transitions to adulthood. However, the
researchers found that the best predictor of smoking initiation was simply the students'
beliefs about the prevalence of tobacco use; high-risk adolescents dramatically
overestimated that actual extent of smoking. Therefore, they authors asserted that
"correcting adolescents' misperceptions about the extent of smoking in the population
may be a useful addition to prevention campaigns” (Chassin et al., 1984, p. 239).
It is important to consider, though, that the researchers did not establish clear
cause and effect relations in either experiment. Adolescents who demonstrated the false
consensus effect and perceived smoking to be more common may have differed in
significant ways from their peers who did not show evidence of this bias. Perhaps the
adults and friends in their life smoked, which in turn, caused them to overestimate
prevalence as well as begin smoking due to a social learning influence. However, this
problem is difficult to circumvent as random assignment is not possible. Consequently,
this study will examine the influence of perceived social norms on behavioral intentions
across a series of issues to determine if this bias does seem to have a consistent influence
on likelihood to engage in socially motivated behavior.
This study has three goals: (a) to assess the perceived source of social norms for
college students, (b) to replicate and expand the social issues for which students show
the false consensus effect, and (c) to demonstrate that this bias does relate to behavioral
intentions. Previous research has shown that adolescents are strongly influenced by
their peers' beliefs and behaviors (Laflin, Moore-Hirschl, Weis, & Hayes, 1994;
Wilks, Callan, & Austin, 1989). Furthermore, factor analyses based on predicting
smokeless tobacco use among college athletes determined that family, peers, and
advertising figures were the basis for subjective norms concerning this activity
(Gottlieb, Gingiss, & Weinstein, 1992). Therefore, the first goal of this study was to
establish the source of social norms for young adults in college. It was expected that
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students would be most influenced by close friends and significant others, followed by
other students, parents and family members, and the media. To assess the source of
norms, subjects were asked to rate the degree to which each group influences their
beliefs about social issues. Additionally, they indicated which social groups influenced
their thinking for each of the issues being examined.
Second, an attempt was made to replicate the findings from Study 1. Subjects
were given an expanded list of social issues to determine if the effects are consistent
across issues and people. The new issues tapped more current social concerns, including
the legalization of homosexual marriage, pornography on the Internet, and homosexuals
adopting children. Furthermore, the phrasing of the issues was modified to control for
differential construal of the items. Gilovich (1990) found larger false consensus effects
for items which allowed the greatest latitude for subjective interpretation. For
example, he examined people’s preferences for American versus Italian food compared to
fried chicken and veal parmigiana. In general, he found much larger effects for the non
specific wording. Therefore, the differences in Study 2 were compared to Study 1 to
assess the effects of word specificity on the FCE.
Finally, a behavioral measure was utilized to measure the influence of false
consensus on behavioral intentions related to each issue. It was predicted that people
who are in favor of a particular issue would be more likely to engage in related
behaviors. Additionally, people who display the FCE should be more likely to engage in
each behavior. Consequently, standard multiple regressions were run to determine the
influence of false consensus as well as attitudes. This model mirrors Ajzen and
Fishbein's theory of reasoned action in that attitudes and social norms were both entered
into an equation to predict behavioral intentions.
This measure of norms is an estimate of the degree to which subjects fall prey to
the false consensus bias. This measure was described in part by Krueger and Zeiger
(1993) in their description of the “truly false consensus effect.” To determine if
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subjects were projecting beyond what would be expected, they calculated correlations
between each subjects' position and the difference between actual and estimated
consensus. This difference variable was used in the current study as a measure of the
degree to which subjects display false consensus. Last, a measure of certainty regarding
accuracy of perceptions was included as it has been shown to be predictive of behaviors
by influencing people’s judgments of consensus (see Trafimow, 1994).
Individual Difference Variables
Several individual differences variables also have been shown to moderate the
relation between attitudes and behavior. By including these variables in the study, it
might be possible to get a clearer understanding of the impact of personality variables on
people’s attitudes and behavioral intentions toward various social issues.
Mariowe-Crowne Social Desirability (SD). The Marlowe-Crowne scale (Crowne
& Marlowe, 1960) measures the "need for approval" or the "avoidance of disapproval"
when responding to questionnaires. A high score on this scale is indicative of the
people’s tendency to respond in the conventional manner or to experimental demand
characteristics. Because of the controversial nature of the issues selected for this
research, it seemed important to assess the role of socially desirable responding. If
people are basing their judgments on what they perceive as socially appropriate, these
beliefs should also influence their behavioral likelihood scores. Therefore, it was
predicted that higher social desirability scores would be predictive of behavioral
intentions.
Self-monitoring (SM). In a meta-analysis conducted by Kraus (1995), he found
that scores on self-monitoring significantly moderated the relation between attitudes and
behavior, such that low self-monitors had stronger correlations between their attitudes
and behavior (.50 versus .25 for low versus high self-monitors, respectively). This
tendency has been supported by several studies, including research conducted by Prislin
and Kovrlija (1 992), who showed that class attendance was more highly related to
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attitudes for low self-monitors than high self-monitors. Furthermore, subjective
norms were more predictive of high self-monitors’ intentions to attend class.
Ajzen, Timko, and White (1982) qualified these findings. They surveyed 155
undergraduates at three time periods during which they asked them questions relating to
their voting and drug use behavioral intentions. Using this technique, they were able to
get measures of intentions and actual behavior (i.e., did they smoke marijuana or vote
for the candidate they supported). While they found that low self-monitors did have
consistently higher correlations between their attitudes and behaviors than did high
self-monitors, these differences were not predictive of behavioral intentions. Rather,
the differences were observed in the reports of actual behavior; low self-monitors were
more likely to have fulfilled their behavioral intentions. The authors reasoned that this
finding was due to the situational pressures placed on high self-monitors which
influenced their decision between the time they stated their intention and carried out the
behavior (Ajzen, Timko, & White, 1982). Based on this research, it was predicted that
the strength of the correlations between attitudes and behavior would be stronger for low
self-monitors (see also DeBono & Snyder, 1995). Moreover, it was predicted that that
low self-monitors’ behavioral intentions would be best predicted by their attitudes,
while high self-monitors’ intentions would also be moderated by their false consensus
scores and other personality variables.
Social Self-Esteem (SE). Previous research (Dielman, Campanelli, Shope &
Butchart, 1987) has suggested that individuals with lower self-esteem are more likely
to engage in peer-pressured behaviors, including drinking and drug use, while recent
research claims that higher self-esteem is associated with these behaviors because of
their role in impression management (Sharp & Getz, 1996). In an examination of
alcohol and cigarette use among college students, Sharp and Getz demonstrated that people
who were more likely to begin drinking scored higher in self-esteem and self
monitoring. Therefore, it was hypothesized that higher scores in self-esteem would be
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more predictive of people’s likelihood to engage in behaviors related to each issue.
However, because the researchers argued that this finding occurred because of
impression management, only behaviors that are viewed as increasing social acceptance
will be affected. In other words, behavior which is most influenced by peers should
show the effect to the greatest extent.
Method
Subjects
Two hundred and three college students (49 males and 154 females) participated
in this study in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. The participants ranged in
age from 18 to 25 with an average age of 18.50 (SD = 1.95). The majority of students
were freshmen (85%) who were Caucasian (95%) and Catholic (58%). Additionally,
67 percent defined themselves as liberal, while 31 percent considered themselves
conservative. Sixty six percent of the sample believed that they were “similar to their
peers” while seventy eight percent of the students believed that “most college students
try to be similar to their peers”.
Materials
False consensus. The questionnaire described in Study 1 was utilized with the
addition of several topics, including adoption rights for homosexual couples, marriage
between homosexual couples, and pornography on the Internet (see Appendices A and B).
Furthermore, several items were reworded to make the issue more concrete and leave
less room for interpretation (e.g., abortion was changed to “the right for a woman to
choose an abortion”.) A behavioral questionnaire was also added to assess the likelihood
that subjects will engage in acts related to each issue orr a 7-point Likert scale (see
Appendix C). Then, a questionnaire which asked subjects to answer whether they would
engage in each behavior and to estimate the frequency of these same behaviors for their
peers was included (see Appendix D). An 11 -point rating scale (from -5 to +5, ranging
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from strongly disagree to strongly agree with 0 indicating a completely neutral
position) was also utilized to rate the direction and strength of participants' attitudes
(see Appendix E). Finally, a measure of certainty about subjects' estimates on each
issue to measure their perceived accuracy was attached (see Appendix B).
Source of social norms. The second part of the questionnaire tapped the source of
people's norms. Students assessed the degree to which they believed potential referents
(e.g., parents, friends, religious figures, teachers) influenced personal judgments of
social norms on a seven-point Likert scale (see Appendix F). This measure assessed the
relative strength of influence of each of these groups. Additionally, a checklist format
was utilized, so that for each topic, subjects checked all of the groups that influence
their thinking on that item (see Appendix A).
Personality scales. The next part of the questionnaire consisted of several
personality scales, including social desirability, self-monitoring, and social self
esteem. The Mariowe-Crowne scale which measures the "need for approval" or the
"avoidance of disapproval" when responding to questionnaires was used to tap social
desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The 33 item true/false scale consists of
ordinary interpersonal and personal behaviors, which fall into two categories;
desirable but uncommon behaviors and undesirable, but common behaviors. A high score
on this scale is indicative of the subjects' tendency to respond in the conventional
manner or to experimental demand characteristics. In the original sample (Crowne &
Marlowe, 1960), a mean score of 15.5 (SD = 4.4) was obtained, however more recent
examinations (Paulhus, 1984) revealed lower averages (e.g., R = 13.3, SD = 4.3).
Reliability values have been consistently strong, ranging from .73 to .88 (Paulhus,
1991). Convergent and discriminant validity has been demonstrated with the use of
correlates, such as responses to social reinforcement and social influence.

Socially

desirable responding was deemed crucial to consider because subjects may give
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responses that are influenced by demand characteristics of the experiment (see Appendix
G).
Snyder’s (1 9 74 ) original self-monitoring scale was utilized in this experiment.
Self-monitoring measures the source of individuals' norms; internal factors or
external sources. Snyder noticed that some individuals appear to be more concerned and
skilled at adapting their personality and behavior to match their surroundings. He
labeled this ability self-monitoring and devised a 25 point true/false scale to measure
this individual difference variable. Individuals who receive high scores on this measure
typically possess numerous social selves which change according to the situation.
Basically, these individuals can be considered actors who are attuned to their
surroundings and change their behaviors according. People who score on the low end of
this scale behave in a more consistent manner which is representative of their true
thoughts, feelings, and attitudes. These people value a single identity which is not
compromised by the situation (see Appendix H).
The social self-esteem measure (Texas Social Behavior Inventory; Helmreich &
Stapp, 1974) was employed to determine the influence of people's self-assurance in
social situations on their likelihood to display false consensus. This 32-item scale was
designed to be a measure of social competence with four sub-scales: confidence,
dominance, social competence, and social withdrawal (see Appendix I). Subjects respond
to items on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 0 “not at all characteristic of me” to
4 “very characteristic of me.” It has been shown to have good internal consistency and
validity (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991).
Demographics. The final section consisted of demographic information, including
sex, age, class, number of months at the present university, religion, major, G.P.A., and
SAT scores. The final two questions were designed to assess personal awareness of social
influence. These items asked if students believe that they try to be similar or different

36

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

from their peers and if, in general, college students try to be similar or different than
their peers (see Appendix J).
Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaire in groups of approximately thirty
individuals in a classroom setting. All students answered the self ratings on the
controversial issues scale first, followed by the peer estimates. The remainder of the
information was presented in the order described in the materials section. After
completing the packet, all subjects were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Completion of the questionnaire took approximately 45 minutes for most participants.
Results and Discussion
This study was designed to accomplish three different goals: (a) to assess the
perceived source of social norms for college students, (b) to replicate and expand the
social issues for which students show the false consensus effect, and (c) to demonstrate
that this bias relates to behavioral intentions.
Source of Social Norms
To test the first assumption that people derive their norms from observation of
peers’ beliefs and behaviors (c.f., Laflin, Moore-Hirschl, Weis, & Hayes, 1994;
Norman & Tedeschi, 1989), the data concerning the source of social norms were
examined. It was predicted that students would be most influenced by close friends and
significant others, followed by other students, parents and family members, and the
media. To examine this hypothesis, descriptive statistics were calculated using SPSS to
determine which group was perceived as most influential by the subjects on a scale
ranging from 1 ( “not at all influential”) to 7 ( “very influential”). The results
generally supported the hypothesis because participants perceived that their parents and
close friends, followed by significant others, siblings, and teachers had the greatest
impact on their beliefs. Other students, though, were perceived as having relatively
little influence on the participants’ beliefs. Table 2 shows the means, standard
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deviations, and total number of subjects for each group in order of descending
importance. Significant differences between the groups were calculated by conducting
dependent means t-tests between the groups, controlling for Type 1 error by using the
Bonferroni correction. Differences between the groups are indicated by the presence of
different subscripts; groups with the same subscripts are not significantly different.
All differences are significant at the j> < .005 level.
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Table 2

Perceived Influence of Various Social Groups on Social Norms

Group

Mean

Standard Deviation

N

Parents
Close friends
Significant others
Siblings
Teachers
Television
Newspapers
Other students
Grandparents
Religious figures

5.96a

1.28
1.43
1.95
1.95
1.50
1.61
1.66
1.61
1.81
1.83

203
203

5.50b
4.55c
4.46c
4.44 c
3.95d
3.83d
3.72d
3.67d
2.95e

200
200
203

202
202
203
203

202

Note. Different subscripts indicate significant differences between the groups at the
g < .005 level.
Additionally, a principal components factor analysis using varimax rotation was
run to establish if there were any underlying dimensions that represented the different
social groups. Factors for which the eigenvalues were greater than one were retained.
The results from this analysis indicated that there were three major factors; peers,
media, and family/religious influence, supporting Gottlieb, Gingiss, and Weinstein’s
(1 992) findings. Table 3 summarizes the major findings from this factor analysis,
including the factor loadings, eigenvalues, variance explained, and reliability
coefficients.
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Table 3

Factor Analysis Assessing the Source of Social Norms

Factor
1
Peers

2

3
Media

Family/Religious figures

Group
Friends
Significant others
Otherstudents
Teachers

.80
.78
.78
.56

.15
-.0 7
.18
.22

.15
.13
.15
.13

Television
Newspapers

.08
.21

.93
.90

- .0 0
.06

Parents
Religious figures
Grandparents
Siblings

.16
- .0 3
.31
.46

-.0 4
.27
-.0 6
-.1 0

.75
.67
.65
.50

Eigenvalue
Percent variance
Reliability

3.39
3 3.90
.76

1.71
17.10
.88

1.10
11.00
.63

Participants also completed a dichotomous scale in which they were asked to
check all of the groups that had influenced the source of their beliefs for each issue. In
order to calculate the perceived impact of these various social groups, two different
measures were computed. First, the scores were coded as a dichotomous variable (0 =
no; 1 = yes). Then, people’s answers were summed across each issue, divided by the
total number of issues (N = 20) and multiplied by 100 in order to get a value which
represents the relative frequency with which each group was cited. This measure gives
an overall index of influence across issues out of a total one hundred percent. This
information provided additional support for the influence of friends and parents;
however, the media was the most frequently checked option. Interestingly, dating
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partners or spouses were listed second to last, followed only by religious figures. The
results of this analysis can be seen in Table 4.

Table 4
Relative Frequency of Social Influence across Issues

Social Group

Mean

Media
Parents
Close friends
Siblings
Other relatives
Otherstudents
Dating partner/spouse
Religious figures

4 2 .6 3 a
4 1 .3 6 a
33.03b
1 7 .5 3 c
1 5.25c
1 3.31c
1 2.32c
7 .8 3 d

Standard Deviation
30.44
25.80
25.12
21.56
18.06
16.81
16.14
11.54

Note. Different subscripts indicate significant differences between the groups at the
J2 < .005 level.
N = 198.

The second index reports the three social groups which were checked most
frequently by all subjects, providing a more sensitive measure of social norms for each
topic. For example, regarding people’s attitudes toward abortion, friends were cited as
influential by 54% of the participants, parents were listed 53% of the time, and the
media was considered important by 37% of the sample. The most commonly cited groups
(friends, parents, media) parallel the findings from the factor analysis.
It is logical to expect that different sources would differentially influence
people’s thinking for various issues. For example, parents were rated most important
for homosexual adoption, gays in military, seatbelt laws, and ban on public smoking.
Friends were rated as most important concerning abortion, lowering the drinking age,
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and condom distribution in high schools. Surprisingly, the media was listed as most
influential for the remaining twelve issues. The findings from that questionnaire are
presented in Table 5.
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Table 5

Percentages Representing the Most Influential Social Groups for Each Issue

Ranking
Issue

1

2

3

Abortion

Friends
(53.50%)

Parents
( 5 3 .0 0 % )

Media
( 3 6 .9 0 % )

Euthanasia

Media
(49.50%)

Parents
( 4 1 .4 0 % )

Friends
( 2 6 .8 0 % )

Death penalty

Media
(53.00%)

Parents
( 4 3 .4 0 % )

Friends
(26.80%)

Medical
research

Media
(48.00%)

Parents
( 3 8 .4 0 % )

Friends
(33.80%)

Cosmetic
research

Media
(4 9 . 5 0 % )

Friends
( 3 1 .8 0 % )

Parents
( 2 7 .8 0 % )

Homosexual
adoption

Parents
(4 0 . 4 0 % )

Friends
(3 3 .8 0 % )

Media
( 3 1 .3 0 % )

Legalization
of drugs

Media
(45.50%)

Friends
( 3 9 .9 0 % )

Parents
( 3 6 .9 0 % )

Pornography

Media
(34.30%)

Parents
(2 8 .8 0 % )

Friends
( 2 4 .7 0 % )

Insanity plea

Media
( 5 4 .5 0 % )

Parents
( 3 7 .4 0 % )

Friends
(18.70%)

Gays in military

Parents
(41.40%)

Media
(3 8 .4 0 % )

Friends
( 3 2 .3 0 % )

Drinking age

Friends
(49.50%)

Parents
( 3 5 .4 0 % )

Media
( 3 0 .3 0 % )

Foreign aid

Media
(5 3 . 5 0 % )

Parents
(4 5 .5 0 % )

Friends
( 1 3 .1 0 % )

Seatbelt laws

Parents
( 6 6 .2 0 % )

Media
( 4 1 .9 0 % )

Friends
(3 8 .9 0 % )

Gun sales

Media
( 5 6 .6 0 % )

Parents
( 5 4 .0 0 % )

Friends
( 2 7 .8 0 % )
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Table 5 (cont.)

Smoking ban

Parents
(53.00% )

Friends
( 4 2 .4 0% )

Media
(32.80% )

Women
in combat

Media
(40.40% )

Parents
(3 9 .9 0 % )

Friends
(38.40%)

Condom
distribution

Friends
(54.50% )

Media
( 4 4 .4 0% )

Parents
(36.90%)

Affirmative
action

Media
(41.40% )

Parents
( 3 4 .8 0% )

Friends
(22.20%)

Homosexual
marriage

Media
(32.80% )

Parents
( 3 1 .8 0 % )

Friends
(22.20%)

Prayer
in schools

Parents
(40.90% )

Media
( 3 7 .4 0% )

Friends
(29.30%)
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The findings from the social norms questionnaires generally supported the
hypothesis that people derive their beliefs concerning controversial social issues from
parents, peers, and the media. It is important to acknowledge that these results reflect
the subjects’ perceptions, rather than any direct measure of influence. However,
research suggests that perceptions, rather than reality, often guide adolescents’
decisions. For example, Wilks, Callan, and Austin (1989) showed that perceptions of
peers’ alcohol usage were generally more predictive of drinking behaviors than
assessments of parents’ actual drinking habits. Additionally, Cummings and Corney
(1987) noted that people’s normative beliefs do not have to accurately reflect
referents’ beliefs to be significant predictors of behavioral intentions in regard to
gambling behavior. Therefore, the influence of perceptions should not be
underestimated.
In most cases, the information from the three measures provided confirmation
regarding the importance of the various social groups. Parents and friends consistently
were perceived as the most important groups in determining the students’ beliefs.
However, the media was emphasized only when people were asked to consider the source
of influence for each issue. Therefore, it appears that individuals do not generally
believe the media, including newspapers and television, affects their thinking, but they
must have received some amount of information from these sources, which is triggered
when they see the topics presented. This finding may be explained in terms of the
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973); people are not consciously aware
«

of the influence of the media until they read the issues which brings current references
to mind, namely the television and newspapers.
One conflicting finding was that significant others, including dating partners and
spouses, were rated highly on the general measure which asked people to assess the
impact of various groups on the development of their personal beliefs (see Table 2), but
they were ranked second to last based on the measure of relative influence across issues
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(see Table 4). This finding might be an artifact of the question wording because the first
measure asks people very generally to rate the impact of dating partners or spouses on
their personal beliefs, while the second questionnaire asked them to assess the influence
of these groups on their beliefs for a specific topic. Since no information was collected
regarding the dating or marital status of the participants in the research, it is
reasonable to assume that many of the subjects who were first semester freshmen did
not currently have a dating partner who would exert any influence about these topical
issues. However, the more general question might be tapping into influence exerted by
previous partners or reflecting participants’ beliefs about how someone in this role
might sway personal beliefs in the future.
Finally, the factor analysis provided compelling evidence that the sources of
influence could be divided into three main groups; peers, family, and the media (see
Table 3). These groupings are then reflected in the responses students gave to the
checklist questionnaire as these groups (friends, parents, media) were consistently
listed as the three most influential sources (see Table 5). This knowledge could be very
helpful in establishing which groups could be effective in changing normative standards
for behavior. Programs directed at high-risk homosexual behavior have been effective
by training high status leaders in the group to endorse safer sexual practices (Kelly et
al., 1991, 1992). Based on the sources of social norms for these issues, campaigns
should be directed at the most influential groups, including the presentation of these
issues in the media.
Replication and Extension of False Consensus Effect
The second goal of this study was to replicate and extend the findings from Study
1. It was hypothesized that subjects would display a false consensus effect, in which
people who support a particular position estimate that a greater number of their peers
also support this position relative to individuals who are opposed. To test this
prediction, t-tests were conducted on the consensus estimates between individuals who
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support and people who oppose each position. Descriptive statistics were obtained for
each issue using SPSS. The means and standard deviations for ratings on each issue are
presented in Table 6, as well as the t and p values. Last, the actual number of subjects
who endorse each position is listed in brackets in the table. A Bonferroni correction was
used to control for Type 1 error due to the large number of comparisons being made.
Eighteen of the twenty issues displayed the false consensus at the p < .05 level. With the
Bonferroni correction, sixteen of the twenty issues supported the false consensus
hypothesis.
This analysis is a replication of the tests conducted in Study 1 with the addition of
several items (i.e., “animal research for cosmetics” (item 5), “the right for
homosexual couples to adopt children” (item 5), “pornography on the Internet” (item
8), and “the right for homosexuals to legally marry” (item 19)). Furthermore, some
of the items were reworded in order to make the statements less ambiguous. For
example “abortion” was modified to read “the right for a woman to choose an abortion"
(see Appendix A for a complete list of modified items). Overall, the effect did replicate
with a few exceptions; Study 2, unlike Study 1, found a significant false consensus effect
for ban on gun sales and racial quotas for employment.
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Table 6

T-Test Analyses to Measure False Consensus Comparing Consensus Estimates Between
Participants Who Support or Oppose Various Social Issues
FOR
Issues

Mean

Abortion

6 7 . 4 1 ( 1 6 . 1 7 ) [1 7 1 ]

6 2 .6 7 ( 1 3 .2 4 ) [ 3 0 ]

1.52

.131

Euthanasia

5 4 . 3 2 ( 1 6 . 6 0 ) [ 1 34]

3 4 .8 5 (1 8 .37 ) [ 6 5 ]

7.49

.000**

Death penalty

58.61 ( 1 8 . 3 8 ) [ 1 53]

5 2 .5 0 (1 6 .5 8 ) [4 4 ]

1.99

.0 4 8 *

Medical research

5 9 . 8 9 ( 1 9 . 5 8 ) [ 1 37]

43 .5 2 (2 4 .4 7 ) [ 6 3 ]

4.67

.000**

Cosmetic research 4 8 . 1 8 ( 2 3 . 1 6 ) [1 1 ]

25 .0 4 (2 2 .4 2 ) [ 1 89]

3.32

.001**

Homosexual
adoption

49.64(1 9 .5 4 ) [ 1 20]

38.51 (20.51 )[ 79]

3.86

.000**

Drugs legalized

73.41 ( 1 8 . 4 4 ) [ 8 5 ]

58.41 (20.9 3 ) [ 1 14]

5.26

.000**

Pornography
on the Internet

68.11(19.92)[72]

4 3 .0 9 (2 4 .0 6 ) [ 1 27]

7.49

.000**

Insanity plea

58.62(1 7.63)[81 ]

4 3 .6 3 (1 8 .6 4 ) [ 1 1 8]

5.70

.000**

Gays in the military53.8 6 (2 0 .1 9 ) [1 71 ]

44.36(20.41 )[ 2 8]

2.24

.026*

Lower drinking age85.30(1 5 . 6 4 ) [ 1 24]

7 2 . 9 7 (1 8 .2 2 )[7 6 ]

5.08

.000**

Foreign aid

55.32(16.74)[109]

44.1 7(1 6 .7 5 ) [ 8 7 ]

4.63

.000**

Mandatory
seatbelt laws

6 4 . 8 6 ( 2 2 . 43)[1 59]

3 5 .7 6 (1 8 .6 7 ) [4 2 ]

7.72

.000**

Ban on gun sales

61.60(1 8.49) [1 68]

4 8 . 6 2 (1 9 .8 0 ) [3 2 ]

3.60

.000**

Ban on public
smoking

4 3 . 7 2 ( 2 1 . 6 5 ) [ 1 10]

33 .5 3 (2 1 .8 2 ) [9 0 ]

3.34

.001**

Women in combat 6 5 . 2 7 ( 1 8 . 3 6 ) [ 1 7 9 ]

47.27(1 9 .4 4 )[ 22 ]

4.31

.000**

Condom
8 1 . 6 9 ( 1 6 .8 9 ) [ 1 6 4 ]
distribution in schools

61 .6 8 (2 0 .1 7 ) [34]

6.07

.000**

41.27(20.1 7) [ 129]

4.80

.000**

Racial quotas
for employment

(SD)

AGAINST
TNI

56.84(22.62)[62]

Mean

(SD)

TNI

t
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p

Table 6 (c o n t)

Homosexual
marriage

44.81 ( 1 9 . 6 2 ) [ 1 45]

3 9 .1 7 ( 2 7 . 4 4 ) [ 5 3 ]

1.37

Prayer in
4 4 . 1 7 ( 1 8 . 5 7 ) [ 1 2]
2 2 . 5 0 ( 1 7 . 4 5 ) [ 1 81 ]
4.15
public schools_____________________________________________________

* B < .05.
** Significant with Bonferroni correction (b<-0025).
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.173

.000**

A similar analysis was conducted on the behavioral items to determine if there
was a false consensus effect for people who would engage in a given behavior relative to
individuals who would not engage in each behavior. Items were worded so that they would
be relevant to all groups, for example, the behavioral item relating to women’s right to
have an abortion was “Would you go with a friend who was having an abortion?”
Therefore, males and females could both answer this question. For a complete list of the
behavioral items, see Appendix C. It was also necessary to recode four of the items
( “gays in the military” (item 10), “mandatory seatbelt law” (item 13),

“women in

combat” (item 16) and “prayer in public schools” (item 20)) so that the statements
were all worded in the same direction and there was a positive correlation between the
attitude and behavior questions. In order to demonstrate the false consensus effect, ttests were then conducted on the average estimates of these groups. The means and
standard deviations for ratings on each issue are shown in Table 7, as well as the tand p
values for each issue. The total number of people who actually support each position is
also listed in brackets in the table. Last, a Bonferroni correction was used to control for
Type 1 error due to the large number of comparisons being made.
Overall, fourteen of the twenty issues displayed the false consensus effect. Using
the more stringent alpha level reduced the number of significant differences to thirteen
of the twenty issues. Surprisingly, the issues for which the effect was not found using
the behavioral indices were different from the issues when the attitudinal variable was
analyzed (compare Tables 6 and 7).
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Table 7

T-Test Analyses to Measure False Consensus Comparing Consensus Estimates Between
Participants Who Engage or Do Not Enaaae in Behavior Related to Various Social Issues
YES
(SD)

NO

Issues

Mean

TNI

Abortion

69.82(1 5 . 6 7 ) [ 1 7 4 ]

55.00(1 6 . 7 2 ) [ 2 8 ]

4.60

.000**

Euthanasia

5 2 .5 8 (1 8 . 8 8 ) [ 6 6 ]

29.21 ( 2 2 . 0 4 ) [ 1 29]

7.34

.000**

Death penalty

65.84(1 7 . 9 5 ) [ 1 55]

53.1 9(1 8 .1 9 ) [47]

4.22

.000**

Medical research

60.73(1 9 . 2 2 ) [ 1 29]

38.49(1 9 .9 4 ) [ 7 2 ]

7.76

.000**

Cosmetic research 61 .5 5 (2 0 .9 5 ) [ 5 3 ]

4 0 .9 3 ( 2 6 .0 7 ) [ 1 49]

5.19

.000**

Homosexual
adoption

36.52(1 5 .9 6 ) [ 8 5 ]

3 4 . 8 4 ( 2 3 . 7 4 ) [ 1 1 6]

.60

Drugs legalized

7 9 .0 2 (1 4 . 8 6 ) [ 1 21]

70.27(20.67)[82]

3.30

.001**

Pornography
on the Internet

51.45(19.11)[20]

3 3 .2 0 ( 2 4 .40)[1 82]

3.23

.001**

Insanity plea

55.35(1 7 . 0 7 ) [ 8 6 ]

45.52(1 7.5 5) [ 113]

3.96

.000**

Gays in the military56.61 ( 1 7 . 4 0 ) [ 1 73]

52.20(17.98)[25]

1.18

.240

Lower drinking a g e 8 0. 3 2( 1 2 .0 8 )[ 1 56]

64.47(21.05)[47]

4.92

.000**

Foreign aid

4 9 . 1 9 (1 6 . 7 0 ) [ 6 2 ]

4 4 .5 9 ( 2 0 .8 7 ) [133]

1.52

.130

Mandatory
seatbelt laws

4 8 . 5 1 (1 9 .8 0 ) [ 1 3 3 ]

29.77(1 8 .7 7 ) [ 7 0 ]

6.53

.000**

Ban on gun sales

56.04(1 7.95) [1 53]

51.11 ( 2 0 .6 9 ) [ 4 5 ]

1.56

.120

Ban on
public smoking

37.49(1 8 . 7 5 ) [ 6 3 ]

3 1 .8 6 ( 2 2 .6 9 ) [ 1 3 8 ]

1.72

.087

Women in combat 6 5 . 6 8 (2 0 .1 8 ) [ 1 67]

42.71(15.90)[35]

6.33

.000**

Condom
7 5 .6 4 (1 6 .6 8 ) [ 1 54]
distribution in schools

5 0 . 3 5 (2 0 .9 4 ) [ 4 3 ]

8.29

.000**

Racial quotas
for employment

4 5 . 9 0 ( 2 1 . 5 2 ) [1 4 0 ]

3.43

.001**

57.61 ( 2 0 . 8 0 ) [ 5 4 ]

Mean

(SD)

TNI

t
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p

.551

Table 7 (cont.)

Homosexual
marriage

4 9 . 2 0 ( 1 9 . 2 3 ) [1 34]

4 0 . 3 7 ( 2 6 . 3 3 ) [6 7 ]

2.44

Prayer in
63.71 ( 2 0 . 2 4 ) [ 1 31 ]
49.31 (2 2 . 7 4 ) [ 6 5 ]
4.50
public schools_____________________________________________________
* e<.05
* * Significant with Bonferroni correction (jd< .0 0 2 5).
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.016*

.000**

The first analysis was conducted to replicate the findings from Study 1. The
findings did replicate with a few exceptions, which could be due, in part, to the larger
sample size which increases the power of the statistical tests. The revised wording,
though, did not appear to affect the results of the test as the items which underwent the
most change, including abortion (item 1), drug legalization (item 7), and prayer in
school (item 20), still displayed a significant effect. Consequently, it can be concluded
that the false consensus effect is very robust and relatively immune to minor
alternations in wording or order of presentation.
The second analysis establishes the false consensus effect for behavioral
endorsements and estimates. Instead of asking people to state their attitude and their
estimates of how many people are in favor of a particular belief, subjects were asked if
they would engage in a behavior and then asked to estimate how many of their peers
would also engage in this behavior. In general, fewer issues displayed a significant FCE
for the behavioral assessment, which could be due to the fact that behaviors can be
observed, while attitudes have to be inferred. This discrepancy may enable people to
make more accurate judgments regarding observable behavior, thus eliminating the
effect One of the original tests supporting the false consensus effect did involve
behavioral intentions and behavior (e.g., asking people if they would be willing to wear a
sandwich board), but this action is not a commonly observed or discussed likelihood
(Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). Perhaps the controversial and topical nature of the
issues selected for this research give people ample opportunity to observe or intuit
correct information regarding their peers’ actions. However, underlying attitudes are
still difficult to interpret, which leads to the false consensus effect for the attitudinal
measure.
False Consensus and Behavioral Intentions
To test the final hypothesis that the false consensus bias would predict behavioral
intentions, a series of standard multiple regression analysis were run. In each case, the
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behavioral likelihood score served as the dependent measure, while participants’
attitudes, degree of false consensus, certainty, and scores on the three personality
variables (self-monitoring, social self-esteem, and social desirability) were used as
predictor variables. It was hypothesized that people’s attitudes would be the best
predictor of their intentions to engage in each behavior; however it was also expected
that the degree of false consensus would explain additional variance. Furthermore,
certainty has been shown to influence the effects of subjective norms, so this variable
was entered into the regression equation. It was hypothesized that higher certainty
scores would be predictive of people’s self-reported likelihood of behavior. Last, the
personality variables were included to see if there are any individual differences in
people’s likelihood to participate in each act. People with high social self-esteem should
be more likely to engage in peer-influenced behavior, while people who are low in social
desirability or self-monitoring were predicted to be less likely to engage in this type of
behavior.
Testing the statistical assumptions. Basic tests concerning the assumptions
underlying the regression analyses were conducted. All of the variables appeared to meet
the criteria concerning normality, linearity, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity,
so no transformations were conducted. The three standard personality measures
employed in this research were also assessed. Scores on the Mariowe-Crowne social
desirability scale were found to be normally distributed with a mean of 13.46 (SD =
5.14) out of a possible 33 items. The average score on the self-monitoring scale was
12.09 (SD = 4.06) out of a total 25 items. Last, subjects had an average score of 2.52
( SD = .51) on the self-esteem scale which ranged from 0 to 4 (higher scores indicating
greater levels of self-esteem). Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were also calculated for
each scale to determine the reliability of the measures. Social desirability had a
standardized alpha of .77, self-monitoring had a value of .68, and self-esteem had a
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reliability coefficient of .90. These scores suggest that the scales are highly internally
consistent and reliable.
Calculating false consensus scores. Participants’ false consensus scores were
calculated in a number of different ways. Based on Krueger and Zeiger’s (1993) truly
false consensus measure, a score was computed for each individual which assessed
his/her overall tendency to overestimate support for his/her position. In order to
calculate this score, within-subject analyses were conducted which correlated each
subjects’ endorsement with the difference between actual consensus and his/her
estimate (r_(endorsement, actual consensus minus consensus estimate)) across twelve
issues. The endorsement variable was coded as 0 (against) and 1 (for), such that
positive correlations suggest that people who are in favor of each issue are
overestimating support or people who are against each issue are underestimating
support. On the other hand, negative correlations indicate that people are not
demonstrating the false consensus bias because their consensus estimates are unrelated
to their personal position. Eight issues were eliminated to control for a potential ceiling
effect; topics for which people estimated that more than 80% or less than 20% of their
peers were in support were removed from the analysis, which resulted in dropping;
“abortion" “death penalty” “cosmetic research” “gays in the military” “ban on
automatic gun sales” “women in combat” “free condom distribution in high schools” and
“enforced prayer in public schools”. High positive correlations indicate an overall
tendency for individuals to fall prey to the false consensus effect. Because there was a
wide range of scores (-.76 to .77), the mean truly false consensus effect (TFCE) was
.05 (SD = .31), which suggests that people do not consistently display the effect across
social issues.
A similar measure was computed based on people’s behavioral endorsements and
estimates, rather than their attitudes. In order to be comparable, the analyses were
conducted on the same twelve issues. Using this technique, the overall behavioral truly
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false consensus effect (BTFCE) was .12 (SD = .36) with a range of -.61 to .77,
supporting the assertion that people do not demonstrate the effect across issues.
Interestingly, these two measures of false consensus were only weakly, albeit
significantly, correlated (r(20 2) =.2 1, p < .01.
Last, false consensus scores were computed for each issue by subtracting the
actual consensus from each person’s estimate to determine the extent to which each
subject overestimated support for their position using the behavioral measure. Higher
difference scores were indicative of people’s tendency to demonstrate the false consensus
bias. Signed values were used as it is necessary to know if a particular subject
demonstrates the effect to a greater or lesser degree. Positive scores indicate people who
are overestimating support, while negative scores suggest that students were
underestimating actual consensus.
Regression analyses using truly false consensus as a predictor variable. These
variables were entered separately into the standard multiple regression analyses to
predict behavioral intentions. In general, the TFCE and BTFCE scores were not shown to
be predictive of people’s behavioral intentions. People’s TFCE scores, which represents
their general tendency to overestimate support for their position, were only predictive
for one issue; lowering the drinking age. The scores based on the behavioral
endorsements and estimates (BTFCE) were only slightly better predictors, as this
variable was a significant predictor for four (legalization of drugs, lowering the
drinking age, affirmative action, and homosexual marriage) of the twenty issues.
Analysis of variance using truly false consensus scores as an independent
variable. Since both variables (attitudinal and behavioral TFCE) appeared to be poor
predictors of behavioral intentions, a median split was utilized to divide people into
groups on the basis of their FCE scores; only the top and bottom 25% of subjects were
used (scores below -.17 and above .29 for TFCE and -.20 and .40 for BTFCE). To
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determine if there were any effects of these variables, a two-way ANOVA was conducted
using position and FCE as the independent variables and behavioral likelihood scores as
the dependent variable. Even using these extreme groups, degree of false consensus
failed to consistently explain differences in people’s behavioral tendencies. Therefore,
it was concluded that it is not possible to conceive of false consensus as a general
tendency across a range of social issues. Subsequently, the individual measure of false
consensus was entered in all of the remaining analyses.
Factor analysis to establish underlying dimensions for the social issues. A
principal components factor analysis using varimax rotation was conducted on the
dependent measures (i.e., behavioral likelihood scores) to determine if there were
patterns of similarity across the issues. The factor analysis failed to converge after 24
iterations, so the unrotated factors were analyzed. While factors emerged, they were
difficult to interpret. Furthermore, similar patterns failed to emerge when the
predictor variables (i.e., attitudes, certainty, and degree of FCE measure) were factor
analyzed. When reliability coefficients were calculated based on the scales produced by
the original factor analysis on the dependent variable, the alpha coefficients were
unsatisfactory; in fact, many of them were negative.
Regression analyses using the individual measure of false consensus as a
predictor. These results suggest that there is not a common dimension underlying these
issues. Consequently, the remaining analyses were conducted on individual issues.
While multiple regression analyses were conducted on all twenty issues, five issues
were selected a priori on the basis of the source of social norms to discuss in more
detail. Issues for which friends or peers had the strongest effect on the norms for
behavior were selected based on Table 5, including “the right for a woman to choose an
abortion ( 1 )”, “legalization and government regulation of drugs ( 7 ) ”, “lower the
drinking age to 18 (11)”, “free condom distribution in high schools (1 7)”, and “ban
on public smoking (15 )”.
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For the remaining analyses, standard multiple regression analyses were
conducted using SPSS. In each case, the behavioral likelihood score served as the
dependent measure, while participants’ attitudes, degree of false consensus for each
issue, certainty, and scores on the three personality variables (self-monitoring, social
self-esteem, and social desirability) were used as predictor variables.
Tables 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16 display the correlations, means, and standard
deviations for all of the variables (i.e., behavioral likelihood scores, attitudes, degree of
false consensus, certainty, self-monitoring, self-esteem, and social desirability)
involved in the regressions for “abortion”, “lower the drinking age to 18”,
“legalization and government regulation of drugs”, “ban on public smoking”, and “free
condom distribution in high schools”, respectively. In order to facilitate interpretation
of the tables, the range of scores for each scale will be reported below. The behavioral
likelihood scores have a range of 1 (“very unlikely”) to 7 (“very likely”). The
attitude scale was assessed using a Likert scale ranging from -5 (“strongly disagree”)
to +5 ( “strongly agree”). Certainty scores were recorded on a scale from 1 (“very
uncertain”) to 5 ( “very certain”). Self-monitoring scores are reported as a sum of 25
total items, while social desirability represents a sum of 33 total items. Last, self
esteem is presented as the mean score on a scale from 0 “not at all characteristics of
me” to 4 “very characteristic of me"; higher scores indicate higher self-confidence.
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Table 8
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviation for “Abortion"

SD

SM

. 6 4 * * . 4 0 * * .07 - . 1 8
.09
.00 - . 1 2
.1 7 * -. 0 5
-.06

-.12

Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SM
SE

FCE

Cert

-.02
.05
.06
-.4 0 **

SE
-

.0 2
.06
.03
.12
.14*
24* *

Mean

SD

5.58 1.91
3.03 3.04
-18.28 16.56
3.25
.96
13.46 5.14
12.09 4.06
2.51
.51

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty; SD = social desirability;
SM = self-monitoring; SE = social self-esteem.
* f i < . 0 5 . * * £ < .0 1 .
N=203.

Tables 9, 11, 13, 15, and 17 display the results of the regression analyses for
the same five topics, including the unstandardized regression coefficients (B) and
intercept, the standardized regression coefficients (Beta), the semipartial correlations
( si^ ), JL R^, and the adjusted r 2.
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Table 9

Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Go With A Friend Who Was
Havina an Abortion" from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social
Desirability (SD). Self-Monitoring (SM). and Self-Esteem (SE)
Predictor variables
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SM
SE
Constant

B
.36
.04
.00
-.06
-.06
.19
6.25

Beta
.58
.34
.00
-.16
-.13
.05

sr2
.31
.11
.00
.02
.01
.00

t
11.68**
6 .88**
-.00
-2.78**
-2.33**
.98
9.34**
R2 = .54
R2 (adjusted) = .53
R = .74**

* e < .05. * * f i <.01.
The R value for the regression concerning “the right for a woman to choose an
abortion” was significantly different from 0, F(6,196) = 38.40, g < .001.
Additionally, four of the predictor variables were found to be significantly related to
people’s likelihood to “go with a friend who was having an abortion.” Attitude toward
abortion (sr2 = .31), degree of false consensus (s i2 = .11), scores on social
desirability (sr2 = .02) and self-monitoring (sr2 = .01) were all found to be
significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All six predictors variables combined
explained 54% (53% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to go with a friend who
was having an abortion (see Table 9).
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Table 10
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Legalization of Drugs"

Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SM
SE

FCE

Cert

SM

SD

.5 5 * * .3 0 ** .17* -.1 7 *
.1 5* .26 - .0 0
.2 8 **- . 12
-. 1 2

.12
.10
.02
.1 4 *
-.4 0 **

SE
.06
.1 8 *
.04
.25**
.15*
.24*

Mean

SD

4.17 2.56
- . 2 0 3.43
15.49 17.92
3.37 1.03
13.46 5.14
12.09 4.06
2.51
.51

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty; SD = social desirability;
SM = self-monitoring; SE = social self-esteem.
*E < .05. * * e < .01.
N=203.

Table 11
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Likelihood to “Smoke Marijuana” from
Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social Desirability (SD). SelfMonitoring (SM). and Self-Esteem (SE)
Predictor variables
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SM
SE
Constant

B
.40
.03
-.11
-.06
.02
-.1 7
5.15

Beta

sr2

.54
.23
-.04
-.13
.03
- .0 3

.26
.05
.00
.01
.00
.00

t
9.01
3 .8 0
- .7 2
-1.98'
.46
- .5 3
5.19
R2 = .38
R2 (adjusted) = .36
R = .62**

* £ < .05. **g < .01.
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The R value was significantly different from 0 for “legalization and government
regulation of drugs”, F(6,192) = 19.63, g < .001. Additionally, three of the predictor
variables were found to be significantly related to people’s likelihood to “smoke
marijuana.” Attitude toward the legalization of drugs (s i2 = .26), degree of false
consensus (sr2 = .05), and scores on social desirability (sr2 = .01) were all found to
be significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All six predictors variables combined
explained 38% (36% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to smoke marijuana
(see Table 11).
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Table 12
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviation for “Lowering the Drinking Age to 1 8 ”

Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SM
SE

.56**

FCE

Cert

SD

SM

4 0 * * .07 - . 2 0 * *
. 2 7 * * . 2 0 * * - . 12
.1 8 **- .10
- .10
-

.15*
.07
.06
.19**
.40**

SE
.1 7 *
.1 5 *
.13
.26**
.15*
.24**

Mean

SD

4.87 1.89
1.00 3.64
- . 3 4 16.05
3.78 1.08
13.46 5.14
12.09 4.06
2.51
.51

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty; SD = social desirability;
SM = self-monitoring; SE = social self-esteem.
* B < .05. **fi<.01.
N=203.

Table 13
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Buv a Beer for an Underaaed
Friend” from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social Desirability
(SD). Self-Monitorina (SM). and Self-Esteem (SE)
Predictor variables
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SM
SE
Constant

B
.24
.03
-.22
-.04
.02
.37
4.79

Beta

sr2

.48
.27
- .1 2
-.12
.06
.10

.20
.06
.01
.01
.00
.01

t
8 .12
4.6 2
-2.14
-1.81
.86
1.62
6.93
R2 = .41
R2 (adjusted) = .40
R = .64**

* f i< .05. **fi<.01.
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TheR. value for “lowering the drinking age to 18” was significantly different
from 0, E(6 ,l 93) = 22.71, p < .001. Additionally, three of the predictor variables
were found to be significantly related to people’s likelihood “to buy a beer for an
underaged friend.” Attitude toward lowering the drinking age (sr2 = .20), degree of
false consensus (sr2 = .06), and certainty scores (sr2 = .01 ) were all found to be
significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All six predictors variables combined
explained 41 % (40% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to buy a beer for an
underaged friend (see Table 13).
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Table 14

Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for *Ban on Public Smoking’

Attitude FCE Cert
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SM
SE

.6 1 **.0 4
-.01

.03
-.03
-.14*

SD

SM

SE

.12 - . 0 7
-.06
.11 - . 0 8
-.10
.13 - . 0 5 - . 0 6
-.11
.13
.09
-.4 0 **.1 5 *
.24**

Mean

SD

3.64 2.18
.46 3.66
2.58 21.60
3.14 1.08
13.46 5.14
12.09 4.06
2.51 .51

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty; SD = social desirability;
SM = self-monitoring; SE = social self-esteem.
*E < .05. * * g < . 0 1 .
N=203.

Table 15
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Go Only to Non-Smoking
Restaurants and Bars” from Attitude. Degree Of False Consensus (FCE). Certainty.
Social Desirability (SD). Self-Monitoring (SM). and Self-Esteem (SE)
Predictor variables
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SM
SE
Constant

B
.36
.00
.11
.02
.00
-.04
2.87

Beta

sr2

.60
.05
.06
.06
.00
-.01

.35
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

t
10.38**
.86
.95
.87
.000
-.14
3.46**
R2 = .37
R2 (adjusted) = .35
R = .61**

*f i < .05. * * £ < .01.
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The R. value for the regression analysis for the “ban on public smoking” issue
was significantly different from 0, F(6,192) = 19.12, e < .001. However, only
attitude (sr2 = .35) was found to be significantly related to people’s likelihood to “go
only to non-smoking restaurants and bars.” All six predictor variables combined
explained 37% (35% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to go only to non
smoking establishments (see Table 15).
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Table 16

Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Free Condom Distribution in High
Schools”
Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SM
SE

FCE

Cert

SD

SM

. 8 1 * * . 6 0 * * . 4 2 * * - . 1 7 * .04
.4 6 ** .4 0 **-.2 5 **.1 2
.40**-.13
.06
- . 1 9 * * .13
-.4 0 **

SE
.20**
.11
.14
.10
.14*
.24**

Mean

SD

5.29 2.01
2.96 2.86
- 7 . 0 8 20.49
3.64 1.09
13.46 5.14
12.09 4.06
2.51 .51

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty; SD = social desirability;
SM = self-monitoring; SE = social self-esteem.
*l> < .05. ** b < .01.
N=203.

Table 17
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “Distribute Free Condoms to High
School Seniors” from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social
Desirability (SD). Self-Monitoring (SM). and Self-Esteem (SE)
Predictor variables
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SM
SE
Constant

B
.47
.02
.08
-.00
-.04
.40
3.36

Beta

sr2

.67
.26
.04
-.01
-.08
.10

.31
.05
.00
.00
.00
.01

t
15.05**
6 .0 0 * *
1.06
-.33
- 1.86
2.52*
6 .2 2 * *
R2 = .74
R2 (adjusted) = .73
R = .8 6 **

*B < .05. **g < .01.
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The R. value for “free condom distribution in high schools” was significantly
different from 0, F(6,191) = 88.65, fi < .001. Additionally, three of the predictor
variables were found to be significantly related to people’s likelihood to “distribute free
condoms to high school seniors.” Attitude toward free condom distribution (sr2 = .31),
degree of false consensus (sr2 = .05), and self-esteem scores (sr2 = .01) were all
found to be significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All six predictor variables
combined explained 74% (73% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to distribute
free condoms to high school seniors (see Table 17).
Summary. Overall, based on the five selected issues, students’ own attitudes
were a significant predictor for each dependent variable, while degree of false consensus
was significant for four out of five analyses. The certainty variable and individual
difference scores were inconsistent in their ability to predict behavioral intentions. The
only issue for which false consensus was not a significant predictor was “ban on public
smoking” which is logical because there was not a FCE for this issue. If people are not
demonstrating the bias, it follows that it would not be differentially predictive of their
likelihood to engage in behaviors related to the topic. The remaining four topics did show
the FCE effect, which was subsequently predictive of participants’ behavioral intentions.
Another important observation from the results is that people’s attitudes were
only weakly (if at all) related to their degree of false consensus. For “the right for a
woman to choose an abortion” and “ban on public smoking”, attitudes and degree of false
consensus were not correlated, while for “lowering the drinking age to l 8”,
“legalization and government regulation of drugs”, and “free condom distribution in
high schools”, they were weakly correlated. In all cases, the strength of the correlation
was considerably lower than the correlations between attitudes and behavior and degree
of false consensus and behavior. This finding indicates that people’s estimates of false
consensus are not strongly related to their attitudes, which implies that a significant
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predictor of their behavioral intentions (i.e., degree of false consensus) is unrelated to
their personal beliefs. This finding could be explained in terms of the evaluation
principle proposed by Sherman, Chassin, Presson, and Agostinelii (1984) because
attitudes are only indirectly related to people’s false consensus estimates. This
observation lends support to the prediction that peers’ beliefs are important
determinants of behavior, regardless of personal convictions. Therefore, correcting
misperceptions of these beliefs might help to alleviate several social problems present
on college campuses.
Furthermore, certainty was related to degree of false consensus for all five
issues, which shows that more confident people are more likely to display false
consensus (with the exception of “ban on public smoking” which was negatively
correlated). However, certainty was not predictive of the likelihood to engage in the
behaviors, which might be a function of the wording of the questions. Participants were
asked to rate the certainty of their estimates, which could explain why more confident
individuals showed the false consensus effect to a greater degree. The strong relation
between these variables may have prevented certainty from being an independent
predictor.
Based on the analyses of all twenty issues, attitudes were a significant predictor
in all of the regressions, while false consensus was a significant predictor for thirteen
of the total issues. As suggested by the data already reviewed, the remaining variables
were not generally good predictors of behavioral intentions; certainty and self
monitoring scores were predictive for 3 of 20 issues, while social desirability and self
esteem scores were predictive for only 2 of 20 issues. Because of their failure to
replicate across social issues, these variables cannot be considered reliable factors in
people’s likelihood to engage in different behavior.
As predicted by the theory of reasoned action, attitudes were the best predictors
of behavioral intentions across all of the issues. However, degree of false consensus was
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also a significant predictor for many of the issues, suggesting that people are basing
their behavioral intentions on their largely inaccurate perceptions of their peers’
beliefs. The effect was particularly strong for issues such as “legalization and
government regulation of drugs” and “lowering the drinking age to 18” which have
important ramifications for college students. If students incorrectly believe that a large
percentage of their peers are buying beer for underaged friends or smoking marijuana
and these perceptions are guiding their own behavioral intentions related to these
activities, problems could (and do) ensue. Previous research has shown that people who
overestimate the percentage of individuals who smoke are more likely to smoke
themselves or begin smoking (Botvin, Botvin, Baker, Dusenbury, & Goldberg, 1992;
Chassin, Presson, Sherman, Corty, & Olshavsky, 1984). Other research has
determined that behavioral intentions are reasonably good predictors of actual behaviors
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; van den Putte, 1991). Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that people’s erroneous perceptions may be influencing their decision to engage
in harmful behavior.
Analyses using scales based on the source of social norms. While it is possible to
notice trends in the data, it is difficult to draw conclusions based on the individual
regression analyses. However, the factor analysis failed to generate any consistent
factors, so it was problematic to divide the social issues into scales. Analyzing the data
based on the primary source of the social norms provided some interesting and reliable
results. To accomplish this goal, the five items which were selected as most influenced
by peers were subjected to a reliability analysis (see Table 18). Based on these results,
scale items were computed by summing the variables on the four issues which showed
good reliability; the item concerning the “ban on public smoking” was eliminated due to
poor reliability. The same analysis was conducted on the remaining issues by clustering
topics for which parents or the media were most influential; however, these scales
failed to show acceptable alpha coefficients (see Table 18).
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Table 18

Alpha Coefficients for Factors Based on Perceived Source of Social Norms

Factor

Behavior

Attitude

False Consensus

Certainty

Peers

.63

.63

.60

.79

.42

.44

.03

.72

.30

.32

.64

.85

Abortion
Drug legalization
Lower drinking age
Free condom distribution

Parents
Homosexual adoption
Gays in the military
Seatbelt laws
Ban on public smoking

Media
Euthanasia
Death penalty
Pornography on Internet
Insanity plea
US Aid
Ban on gun sales
Affirmative action
Homosexual marriage

Using the newly constructed scales, additional multiple regression analyses were
run. The results from these analyses provided further support for the original findings.
The R value for the overall regression was significantly different from 0, £(6,188) =
73.69, p < .001. Additionally, three of the predictor variables were found to be
significantly related to people’s behavioral likelihood scores. Attitude (sr2 = .42),
degree of false consensus (sr2 = .04) and scores on social desirability (sr2 = .01) were
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all found to be significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All six predictors
variables combined explained 70% (69% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to
engage in behavior related to the various social issues. Consistent with the separate
analyses, attitudes were the single largest predictor followed by degree of false
consensus (see Tables 19 and 20).

Table 19
Correlations between Behavioral Likelihood Scores. Attitude. Degree Of False Consensus
(FCE). Certainty (Cert). Social Desirability (SD). Self-Esteem (SE). and SelfMonitoring (SM) for Peer-Influenced Issues

Variables
Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SE
SM

.79**

FCE

Cert

SD

.47**
.30**

.2 2 ** - .2 6 * *
.18* - . 1 8 *
.30** -.16*
-.16*

SE

SM

Mean

SD

. 1 6 * .10
19.93 5.81
. 1 9 * * .10
6.83 8.90
.13
.08
- 10 .7 0 49.91
.2 4 ** .18*
14.04 3.26
.1 5* - . 4 0 * * 13.46 5.14
.24**
2.51
.51
12.09 4.06

* p < .05. **e < .01.
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N
20 2
202
198
199
203
203
203

Table 2 0
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Behavioral Intentions from Attitude. Degree of
False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social Desirability (SD). Self-Esteem (SE). and
Self-Monitoring (SM) Based on Peer- influenced Issues

Predictor variables

Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SE
SM
Constant

B

.46
.03
-.02
-.14
.28
-.04
19.08

Beta

.70
.23
-.01
-.12
.02
-.03

s r2

t

.42
.04
.00
.01
.00
.00

16.36
5.16
-. 2 5
- 2.68
.55
-.68
11.36
R2 = .70
R2 (adjusted) = .69
R = .84**

*f> < .05. **[)_< .01.
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Gender differences. Identical multiple regression analyses were also conducted
separately on males and females to determine if any gender differences in people’s
tendency to engage in certain behaviors existed. However, previous research has not
found gender differences in terms of false consensus scores; thus no differences were
predicted. While there were a few unique findings (e.g., males’ behavioral intentions
were not predicted by social desirability), the overall pattern of results remained
unchanged. Tables 21 and 22 present the summary analyses based on the peerinfluenced issues for males and Tables 23 and 24 present the identical analyses for
females.
Table 21
Correlations between Behavioral Likelihood Scores. Attitude. Degree of False Consensus
(FCE). Certainty (Cert). Social Desirability (SD). Self-Esteem (SE). and SelfMonitoring (SM) for Males on Peer-influenced Issues

Variables
Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SE
SM

.79**

SD

FCE

Cert

.50**
.34**

.2 9 ** -.33*
.15
-.30*
.48** -.32*
-.23

SE

SM

Mean

SD

20.24 5.91
.2 9 * .13
. 3 8 * * .23
8.39 8.72
. 3 0 * .24
- 1 1 . 2 9 44.59
.22
.19
14.50 3.75
.04 - . 4 6 * * 13.98 5.14
2.47
.53
.28
12.61 4.32

* e <.05. **fi<.01.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

N
49
49
48
48
49
49
49

Table 22
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Behavioral Intentions from Attitude. Degree of
False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social Desirability (SD). Self-Esteem (SET and
Self-Monitoring (SM) Based on Peer-Influenced Issues for Males

Predictor variables

B

Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SE
SM
Constant

.49
.03
.03
-.13
-.29
-.16
20.76

Beta

.73
.24
.02
-.1 1
-.03
-.12

sr2

t

.39
.04
.00
.01
.00
.01

7.70
2.39
.20
- 1.12
-.27
-1.19
5 .5 4
R2 = .74
R2 (adjusted) = .70
R = .86**

*p < .05. **0 .< .01.

Table 23
Correlations Between Behavioral Likelihood Scores. Attitude. Degree Of False Consensus
(FCE). Certainty (Cert). Social Desirability (SD). Self-Esteem (SE). And SelfMonitoring (SM) for Females on Peer-influenced Issues

Variables
Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SE
SM

.79**

FCE

Cert

SD

.46**
.29**

.18* - . 2 4 * *
.18* -.1 5
.2 5 ** -.12
-.14

SE

SM

Mean

SD

.13
.09
19.83 5.80
.14
6.33 8.94
.05
.08
.03
-1 0.51 49.07
.2 6 * * .16*
13.89 3.09
. 1 9 * - . 3 9 * * 13.30 5.15
.24**
2.54
.51
11.92 3.97

* E < .05. * *e < .0 1 .

75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

N
153
153
150
151
154
154
154

Table 24
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Behavioral Intentions from Attitude. Degree of
False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social Desirability (SD). Self-Esteem (SE). And
Self-Monitorina (SM) Based on Peer-Influenced Issues for Females

Predictor variables

Attitude
FCE
Certainty
SD
SE
SM
Constant

B

.46
.03
-.04
-.14
.40
.00
18.60

Beta

.70
.23
- .0 2
- .1 2
.04
.00

sr2

t

.43
.04
.00
.01
.00
.00

1 4 .0 6
4.57
-.46
-2.25
.66
-.03
9.59
R2 = .69
R2 (adjusted) = .68
R = .83**

*E< .05. * * £ < . 0 1 .
For both males and females, the R value for peer-influenced issues was
significantly different from 0, F(6,40) = 18.53, £<.001 andF(6,141) = 53.43, £<
.001, respectively.

For males, attitude toward free condom distribution (s r2 = .39)

and degree of false consensus (sr2 = .04) were found to be significantly related to
people’s behavioral likelihood scores. For females, attitude (s i2 = .43), degree of false
consensus (s r2 = .04), and scores on social desirability (sr2 = .01) were also found to
be significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All three predictor variables
combined explained 75% (70% adjusted) for males and 69% ( 68% adjusted) for
females’ behavioral likelihood scores (see Tables 22 and 24).
Because previous research has not found gender differences in regard to the
likelihood to demonstrate the false consensus bias, no differences were predicted in this
study. While a few exceptions emerged, they can probably be explained by analyzing the
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specific topics for which differences were found. Furthermore, women’s scores were
marginally more influenced by scores on social desirability. This difference may be
attributed to the nature of the issues examined, such as abortion. Since abortion
differentially affects men and women, it is not surprising that some of the predictor
variables varied. However, since the general pattern of results was so consistent, it was
concluded that gender differences do not play a substantial role in the effect of false
consensus on behavior. Additionally, the small sample size of males (N = 4 9 ) restricted
the number of analyses that could be conducted solely on that population, so remaining
analyses were conducted on both male and female subjects combined.
Self-monitoring. In order to test the prediction that high self-monitors would be
more influenced by false consensus scores, a median split was calculated on the self
monitoring scores. On the basis of this division, participants whose scores fell above 15
were classified as high self-monitors (N = 59), while individuals whose scores fell
below 10 (N = 52) were considered low self-monitors. Based on research which
suggests that low self-monitors are more consistent in their behaviors, it was
hypothesized that their behaviors would be predominately predicted by their attitudes.
On the other hand, high self-monitors are predicted to be influenced by various other
sources, including the social desirability of the behavior and the degree to which they
display the false consensus effect because of their tendency to match their behavior to
the situation.
Standard multiple regression analyses were conducted in which attitudes, degree
of false consensus, and certainty were entered to predict participants’ behavioral
likelihood scores. The remaining personality variables were eliminated from the
analyses because of their lack of predictive value and a concern over the ratio of cases to
predictor variables. These analyses were conducted separately for high and low self
monitors. in order to facilitate comparisons between high and low self-monitors,
results from both regression analyses are reported in the tables (the low self-monitors
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scores are in parentheses). In general, the predictions were supported by the findings
from the analyses. Tables 25 through 39 present the correlations between all of the
variables and the results of the multiple regression analyses.
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Table 25

Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Abortion” for High Self-Monitors

Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty

Attitude

FCE

Cert

Mean

.64**

4.4,*+
.06

.14
.10
.22

5.49
2.98
-17.69
3.34

SD
1.94
3 .34
15.99
.90

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
*E < .05.

.01.

N = 59.

Table 26
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Abortion” for Low Self-Monitors
Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty

.75**

FCE
.49**
.23

Cert

Mean

.11

5.71
3.02
-18.12
3.23

.08
.31*

SD
1.79
2.97
15.38
1.02

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
* e < .05. **fi <. 01 .
N = 52.
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Table 27
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Go with a Friend Who Was
Having an Abortion” from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). and Certainty for
High and Low Self-Monitors

Predictor variables

Attitude
FCE
Certainty
Constant

B

Beta

sr2

.3 6 ( .4 0 )
.0 5 (.0 4 )
-.03(-.08)
5 .3 9 ( 5 . 5 0 )

.6 2 (.6 7 )
.4 0 ( .3 5 )
-.01 ( - . 0 5 )

. 3 8 ( .4 2 )
. 1 6 (. 10 )
.OO(.OO)

t

7.04**(7.87**)
4.52**(3.93**)
-.16
(-.55)
7.2 6 **(8 .7 8 **)
R2 = .58(.67)
R2 (adjusted) = .55(65)
R = .76**( .81 ** )

Note. Low self-monitor scores are reported in parentheses.
< .05. * * e < . 0 1 .

For both high and low self-monitors, the R. value for the regression concerning
“the right for a woman to choose an abortion” was significantly different from 0, F( 3,
55) = 25.04 , p < .001 andF(3, 48) = 32.42 , e < -001, respectively. For high self
monitors, attitude toward abortion (sr2 = .38) and degree of false consensus (sr2 =
.16) were found to be significantly related to people’s likelihood to “go with a friend
who was having an abortion." All three predictor variables combined explained 58%
(55% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to go with a friend who was having an
abortion (see Table 20). For low self-monitors, attitude toward abortion (s r2 = .42)
and degree of false consensus (sr2 = .10) were also significant predictors in the
behavioral likelihood scores. All three predictor variables explained 67% (65%
adjusted) of the total variability (refer to Table 27).
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Table 28
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Legalization of Drugs” fo r High SelfMonitors

Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty

Attitude
.56**

FCE
.43**
.24

Cert
.25
.38**
.20

Mean
4.52
.14
14.69
3.54

SD
2.55
3.63
19.37
1.07

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
*I> < .05. * * e < .01.
N = 59.

Table 29
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Legalization of Drugs” for Low SelfMonitors

Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty

Attitude
.54**

FCE
-.0 9
- .0 4

Cert
-.03
.14
.20

SD N
Mean
3.86 2.56 52
- . 8 6 3.45 50
14.88 16.66 52
3.24
.96 52

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
*B < .05. * * e < .01.
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Table 30
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Smoke Marijuana” from
Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). and Certainty For High and Low SelfMonitors

Predictor variables
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
Constant

B

Beta

.34(.41)
.04(-.01)
.0 2 (-.2 5 )
3.80(5.12)

.49(.56)
.31 ( - . 0 6 )
.01 ( - . 1 0 )

sr2
.19(.30)
.09(.00)
.OO(.OI)

t
4 .3 0 **(4.52**)
2 .9 4 **(-.4 6 )
.08 ( - . 7 6 )
3.90**(4.61 **)

R2 = .41 (.32)
R2 (adjusted) = .38(.27)
R = .64**(.56**)
Note. Low self-monitor scores are reported in parentheses.
* E < .05. * * e < 0 1 .

For both high and low self-monitors, the R. value was significantly different from
0 for “legalization and government regulation of drugs”, F(3,55) = 12.93, e < .001 and
F(3,46) = 7.17, £> < .001, respectively. For high self-monitors, attitude toward the
legalization of drugs (s r2 = .19) and degree of false consensus (sr2 = .09) were found
to be significantly related to people’s likelihood to “smoke marijuana”, while attitudes
(s r2 = .30) were the only significant predictor for low self-monitors. All three
predictors variables explained 41% (38% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to
smoke marijuana for high self-monitors and 31 %(27% adjusted) for low self
monitors (see Table 30).
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Table 31
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Lowering the Drinking Age" for High
Self-M onitors

Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty

Attitude
.60**

FCE
.50**
.25

Cert
.23
.24
.14

SD
1.95
3.79
14.76
1.03

Mean
5.00
.86
- 1.68
3.97

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
< .05. ** b < .01.
N = 59.

Table 32
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Lowering the Drinking Age" for Low
Self-Monitors
Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty

.58**

FCE
.18
.16

Cert
-.3 4 *
.01
.07

Mean

SD

N

4.44 1.93 52
.44 3.59 52
- 2.11 15.37 52
3.53 1.12 51

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
*B < .05. **fi < .01.
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Table 33
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Buv a Beer for an Underaqed
Friend” from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). and Certainty for High and Low
Self-Monitors

Predictor variables
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
Constant

B
.2 5 ( .3 0 )
.0 5 ( . 0 1 )
.12(-.6 1 )
4.40(6.47)

sr*

Beta
.49(.57)
.3 6 ( . l 2)
.06(-.35)

,22(.31)
.1 2 ( . 0 1 )
.06(.12)

4.86**(5.28**)
3 . 3 7 * * ( 1 .10)
.62
(-3.33**)
5.80**(9.47**)
R2 = .49(.47)
R2 (adjusted) = .47(.44)
R = .70**(.69**)

Note. Low self-monitor scores are reported in parentheses.
*E < .05. **j> < .01.

TheR. value for “lowering the drinking age to 18” was significantly different
from 0 for both high and low self-monitors, F(3,55) = 17.90, e < .001 andE(3,47) =
14.04, g < .001, respectively. For high self-monitors, attitude towards lowering the
drinking age (sr2 = .22) and degree of false consensus (s r2 = . 12) were found to be
significantly related to people’s likelihood “to buy a beer for an underaged friend”,
while for low self-monitors, attitude (sr2 = .31) and certainty (s i2 = .12) were
significant predictor of behavioral intentions. The three predictor variables combined
explained 49% (47% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to buy a beer for an
underaged friend for high self-monitors and 47% (44% adjusted) for low self
monitors (see Table 33).
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Table 34
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Ban on Public Smoking” for High
Self-Monitors

Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty

.69**

FCE
-.02
-.03

Cert

Mean

-.16
-.16
-.11

3.47
.00
.30
3.32

SD
2.31
3.79
21.49
1.06

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
* g < .05. **J3 < .01.
N = 59.

Table 35
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Ban on Public Smoking” for Low
Self-Monitors

Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty

.6 6 * *

FCE

Cert

Mean

.05
.07

.20
.10
.07

3.69 2.11 52
.73 3.62 52
2.94 17.58 52
2.96 1.10 50

SD

N

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
* B < .05. **g < .01.
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Table 36
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Go Only to Non-Smoking Bars
and Restaurants” from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). and Certainty for High
and Low Self-Monitors

Predictor variables
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
Constant

B
.41 (. 3 7 )
.OO(.OO)
-.1 1 ( 2 5 )
3.85(2.67)

Beta

sr2

.68(.63)
.OO (- .O I)
-.05(.13)

.45(.40)
.OO(.OO)
.00(.02)

t
6.93**(5 .6 7 **)
-.05 ( - .1 0 )
-.52 (1.18)
5.12 * * (4 .0 2 * * )
R2 = .48(.43)
R2 (adjusted) = .45(.40)
R = .6 9 * * ( . 6 6 * * )

Note. Low self-monitor scores are reported in parentheses.
* p < -05. **p < .01.

For both high and low self-monitors, the R value for the regression analysis for
the “ban on public smoking” issue was significantly different from 0, £(3, 55) =17.00,
p <.001 and F(3,46) = 11.76, p < .001, respectively. However, only attitude (s r2 =
.45 for high self-monitors and .40 for low self-monitors) was found to be significantly
related to people’s likelihood to “go only to non-smoking restaurants and bars.” The
three predictor variables combined explained 48% (45% adjusted) for high self
monitors and 43% (40% adjusted) for low self-monitors of the variability in the
decision to go only to non-smoking establishments (see Table 36).
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Table 37
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Free Condom Distribution in High
Schools” for High Self-Monitors

Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty

Attitude
.7 2 **

FCE
.67**
.53**

Cert
.26*
.36**
.36**

Mean
5.29
3.25
-7.02
3.81

SD
2.11
2.38
19.02
1.04

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
* g < .05. **fi<.01.
N = 59.

Table 38
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Free Condom Distribution in High
Schools" for Low Self-Monitors

Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty

.91**

FCE

Cert

.56**
.46**

.43**
.42**
.33*

Mean

SD

N

5.00 1.93 52
2.29 3.02 52
- 10.2 2 19.65 51
3.39 1.18 51

Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
* jj < .05. **g < .01.
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Table 39
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Distribute Free Condoms to High
School Seniors* from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). and Certainty for High
and Low Self-Monitors

Predictor variables
Attitude
FCE
Certainty
Constant

B
.4 8 (.5 2 )
.0 4 (.0 2 )
- .2 2 ( .0 6 )
4 .9 7 (3 .7 7 )

Beta
.5 4 (.8 1 )
.4 2 ( .l 7)
-.1 1 (.0 3 )

sr2
.2 0 (.4 6 )
.1 2 (.0 2 )
.01 (.0 0 )

t
5 .6 3 **(1 2.1 8 * * )
4 .2 9 * * ( 2 .6 7 * * )
-1 .2 6 ( - .5 6 )
6.61 **(1 0.1 0 * * )
R2 = .6 6 (.8 5 )
R2 (adjusted) = .64(.i
R = .81 * * (.9 2 * * )

Note. Low self-monitor scores are reported in parentheses.
* p < .05. **g < .01.

For both high and low self-monitors, the R value for “free condom distribution
in high schools” was significantly different from 0, F(3,55) = 33.56, g < .001 and
F(3,47) = 89.48,

< .001. For high self-monitors, attitude toward free condom

distribution (s r2 = .20) and degree of false consensus (sr2 = .12) were found to be
significantly related to people’s likelihood to “distribute free condoms to high school
seniors.” For low self-monitors, attitude (sr2 = .46) and degree of false consensus
(s r2 = .02) were also found to be significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All
three predictor variables combined explained 66% (64% adjusted) for high self
monitors and 85% (84% adjusted) for low self-monitors of the variability in the
decision to distribute free condoms to high school seniors (see Table 39).
To summarize the results from the five selected issues, attitudes were a
significant predictor for all five issues for both high and low self-monitors. For high
self-monitors, degree of false consensus was significant for each issue, except “ban on
public smoking”, while it was only predictive for “the right for a woman to choose an
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abortion” and “free condom distribution in high schools” for low self-monitors.
Furthermore, attitudes were a stronger predictor for low self-monitors than high self
monitors for each issue, although the correlations between attitudes and behavior were
not significantly different (Edwards, 1984).
These results were supported by the findings from the combined scale items. In
fact, these analyses demonstrate the differences between high and low self-monitors
even more clearly. The correlations and regression analyses for high and low self
monitors are presented in Tables 40-43.
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Table 40
Correlations Between Behavioral Likelihood Scores. Attitude. Degree of False Consensus
(FCE). and Certainty (C ert) for High Self-Monitors on Peer-influenced Issues

Variables
Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty

.7 2 * *

FCE

Cert

.5 4 * *
.3 4 *

.3 1 *
.3 0 *
.25

Mean

N

SD

20.30
5.86
7.24
9.37
-1 0 .2 6 44.53
14.66
3.21

59
59
57
59

* e < .05. **e<-01.

Table 41
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Behavioral Intentions from Attitude. Degree of
False Consensus (FCE). and Certainty Based on Peer-Influenced Issues for High SelfMonitors

Predictor variables

Attitude
FCE
Certainty
Constant

B

.40
.04
-.0 4
18.60

Beta

.64
.33
-.0 2

sr2

.34
.09
.00

t

7.1 3 * *
3 .7 4 * *
- .2 2
7 .6 2 * *
R2 = .65
R2 (adjusted) = .63
R = .8 0 **

*2_< .05. **fi<.01.
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Table 42
Correlations Between Behavioral Likelihood Scores. A ttitude. Degree Of False Consensus
(FCE). and Certainty (C ert) for Low Self-Monitors on Peer-influenced Issues

Variables
Attitude
Behavior
Attitude
FCE
Certainty

.8 5 * *

FCE

Cert

Mean

SD

.23
.11

.03
.10
.2 8 *

19.02
4.88
-1 5 .4 7
13.38

5.95
9.37
42.28
3.49

N
52
52
51
50

Table 43
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Behavioral Intentions from Attitude. Degree Of
False Consensus (FCE). And Certainty Based on Peer-Influenced Issues for Low SelfMonitors

Predictor variables

Attitude
FCE
Certainty
Constant

B

.54
.02
-.1 7
18.90

Beta

.85
.16
- .1 0

s r2

t

.71
.02
.01

11.92
2.21
-1 .3 3
10.41
R2 = .77
R2 (adjusted) = .75
R = .8 8 **

*fi_< .05. **fi< .0 1 .
For both high and low self-monitors, the R value for peer-influenced issues was
significantly different from 0, F(3,53) = 32.39, p < .0 0 1 andE(3, 46) = 50.99, p<
.001, respectively.

For high self-monitors, attitude (s r2 = .34) and degree of false

consensus (s r2 = .09) were found to be significantly related to people’s behavioral
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likelihood scores. For low self-monitors, attitude (sr2 = .71) and degree of false
consensus (s r2 = .02) were also found to be significant predictors of behavioral
intentions. All three predictor variables combined explained 65% (63% adjusted) for
high self-monitors and 77% (75% adjusted) for low self-monitors’ behavioral
likelihood scores (see Tables 41 and 43).
Across all twenty issues, for high self-monitors, attitudes served as a significant
predictor for all twenty of the items, while degree of false consensus was a significant
predictor for twelve of the twenty issues. Certainty was predictive for only three of the
topics. In support of the hypothesis, for low self-monitors, attitudes were a significant
predictor of behavioral intentions for nineteen of the twenty issues, while degree of false
consensus was a significant predictor for only six topics. Certainty scores were only
predictive in one of the total analyses.
Together, these results suggest that peer influence differs for individuals who
are high versus low in self-monitors. High self-monitors are generally more
influenced by their perceptions of their peers’ beliefs (i.e., false consensus scores).
This finding supports Kraus’ (1995) assertion that self-monitoring moderates the
attitude-behavior relation. Low self-monitors appear to be reporting that they would
behave in a manner consistent with their underlying attitudes, while high self-monitors
are trying to adapt their behavior to fit their surroundings; in this case, their
perceptions of their peers’ behavior. These differences suggest that intervention
campaigns should be structured differently for both groups. Individuals who are high
self-monitors could be reached effectively by using peer interventions, while low self
monitors need persuasion directed at internal beliefs. Evidence from persuasion studies
has shown that different types of approaches work better on these groups; commercials
aimed at improving one’s image worked better for high self-monitors, while
advertisements directed at quality were more effective for low self-monitors (DeBono &
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Packer, 1991). This type of technique could probably be used effectively in
intervention programs designed for individuals who are considered high or low self
monitors.
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IV. STUDY 3

Study 2 demonstrated that false consensus beliefs predict behavioral intentions
related to current social issues. Research has already shown that norm misperceptions
contribute to teenage smoking (Botvin, Botvin, Baker, Dusenbury, & Goldberg (1992),
excessive college drinking (Prentice & Miller, 1993), and dangerous sexual practices
(Chan & Fishbein, 1993;

Morrison, Gillmore, & Baker, 1995; Tashakkori &

Thompson, 1992; White, Terry, & Hogg, 1994). Consequently, it seems important to
try to correct these misperceptions. Many researchers have suggested that intervention
programs would be more successful if they focused on changing normative
misperceptions (Kelly e t al., 1991, 1992; Sherman et al., 1983). Therefore, Study 3
attempted to reduce the false consensus bias related to social norms. This reduction
should hopefully correct some misperceptions about the prevalence of shared support
for certain positions.
A recent set of experiments determined that the false consensus effect is an
“ineradicable bias” (Krueger & Clement, 1994). In a series of studies designed to
correct the bias, the researchers concluded that people are generally unable to avoid
making this egocentric error. In the first experiment, they provided people with two
different types of information. In one condition, they described the false consensus bias
before people made the peer estimates. Other subjects received feedback information
regarding the actual consensus for each item after they made their judgments. [Note: In
order to obtain accurate statistics regarding the actual consensus, the researchers used
MMPI items which have been tested and scaled on thousands of subjects.] The final group
read both types of information. Using several measures of false consensus, they
concluded that the effect is robust and immune to education or feedback about the bias.
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Additionally, they controlled for social desirability of the statements, so they could state
that bias was not a result of endorsing socially desirable items.
In a second study, subjects were given information about a hypothetical subject
who either agreed or disagreed with their position based on random assignment. They
were also asked to estimate the percentage of consensus that this hypothetical person
would give. Finally, they gave another estimate of consensus based on their own position.
Additionally, the order of the questionnaires was varied, such that subjects either
completed the self or other estimate first. The researchers expected that possessing
information about another person's position would eliminate the basic projection effect.
However, this information had little impact on people's estimates (i.e., they did not
incorporate this additional information into their judgment). In sum, the researchers
stated conclusively that the false consensus bias was persistent even in the face of
contradictory or illustrative statistical information.
While Krueger and Clement (1 9 94 ) stated that the effect could not be eliminated,
other researchers have found evidence that the effect can be modified by altering several
features of the typical design to assess false consensus. In a meta-analysis of 115 tests
of the false consensus effect studies, Mullen et al. (1985) found that several variables
influenced this robust effect. While the nature of the comparison population did not
affect the findings, the order of measurement and the number of estimates were found to
influence the effect. Specifically, the effect size was larger when there were fewer
items and when estimates for consensus were made before endorsements.
Furthermore, the number of available options has been shown to reduce the false
consensus effect (Marks & Duval, 1991). By presenting subjects with different
numbers of response alternatives, the authors were able to determine that false
consensus is influenced by the availability heuristic. By making other positions salient
to the subjects, it reduced the tendency to assume that most people shared their beliefs.
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van der Pligt, Eiser, and Spears (1987) supported the finding that the effect was
reduced by giving people more response options. In a study on attitudes toward nuclear
power, subjects were asked to estimate how much power was derived from various
energy-producing sources (e.g., coal, oil, nuclear power), as well as their own personal
preferences for power sources. In a series of studies, the researchers found that
subjects gave higher estimates of consensus when fewer alternatives were listed. In
other words, people were more likely to demonstrate false consensus if they were not
made aware of other potential energy resources. When additional options were
presented, people tended to reduce their estimates, thereby reducing the consensus bias.
The authors concluded that simply reminding participants about alternative energy
sources forced them to give more weight to these possibilities. Based on selective
exposure, it was predicted that the false consensus effect would be reduced by presenting
subjects with arguments supporting both sides of each social issue.
In another test of this theory, Bosveld, Koomen and van der Pligt (1 9 94 ) asked
people to “think aloud” when estimating the prevalence of attitudes about various issues.
Their answers were tape-recorded and coded for the mention of similar or dissimilar
referents. As predicted, people were more likely to mention similar others, which led to
larger false consensus effects. When people did mention dissimilar others, typically
subjects who fell in the minority, false consensus was reduced. Therefore, the
availability heuristic does seem to account, at least in part, for the FCE. People are
using their peers as a reference group by which to judge the social norms. Then, when
they are asked to estimate consensus among fellow college students, their close friends’
attitudes and beliefs are recalled most easily.
The role of selective exposure as a contributing factor for the FCE related to
adolescent smoking behavior was tested directly by Sherman et al. (1 9 8 3 ). They found
that adolescents who overestimated the prevalence of smoking among their peers were
significantly more likely to smoke themselves. Additionally, the number of friends who
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smoked explained a substantial amount o f the variance in peer estimates, suggesting that
high school students were basing their judgments on a limited sample (i.e., their
friends). Deutsch (1987) added additional support for this finding by stating that the
FCE was strongest when people's judgments were similar to their friends.

Overall,

these findings provide additional support for the idea that selective exposure leads to
false consensus bias.
Based on this research, it was hypothesized that the FCE would be reduced by
exposing subjects to information supporting both sides of controversial social issues.
Exposing subjects to information pertaining to all sides of the debate should correct for
the availability heuristic by making both positions salient to the participants. In other
words, it should reduce people’s tendency to simply recall their friends’ beliefs when
asked about their peers; they will have other information on which to base their
estimates. In their review article, Marks and Miller (1987) discussed the role of focus
of attention and argued that "when one's focus shifts between two or more positions,
estimates of consensus for any one may be diluted; that is, estimates may be more or
less evenly distributed among the alternatives (p. 73)." Consequently, this experiment
examined the potential influence of selective exposure by presenting students with
information regarding two current social issues: the legalization and government
regulation of drugs and animal testing for medical purposes. Additionally, the medium of
presentation was varied to determine if written or visual information would be more
effective in reducing the bias.
It was predicted that the effect would be most dramatically reduced in the video
condition because this type of presentation should control for the influence of both
cognitive and motivational explanations. Selective exposure would be eliminated in both
the written and video conditions; however, the motivational need to believe that other
relevant people share the same perspective will only be addressed by the video condition.
Watching peers discuss the issues and argue for both sides should help to reduce the
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tendency to overestimate support for the students’ personal positions caused by a
motivational drive to be similar to one’s peers.
Last, the correlation between participants’ attitudes and consensus estimates
should be reduced if the technique is effective. If additional information is made
‘available’ to the students, their estimates should be based in part on this information,
rather than entirely on their own attitudes. However, if this information is unavailable
to students, they will rely on their attitudes and endorsements which represents simple
projection (Holmes, 1968).
Method
Subjects
Two hundred and eighty students (101 males and 177 females) participated in
this study in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. The subjects ranged in age
from 17 to 30 with an average age of 18.57 (SD = 1.21). The majority of students
were freshmen (82% ) who were Caucasian (97%) and Catholic (57% ). Additionally,
68 percent defined themselves as liberal, while 24 percent considered themselves
conservative. Sixty four percent of the sample believed that they were “similar to their
peers” while seventy eight percent of the students believed that “most college students
try to be similar to their peers.”
Numerous subjects were eliminated in order to reduce the amount of error in the
experiment. Six subjects were eliminated because they mistakenly participated in the
experiment twice. Ten subjects were eliminated from the animal testing analyses
because their answers were illogical. Subjects were excluded on this basis if their
endorsement and attitudinal position were negatively correlated (e.g., they reported
being in favor of animal testing and being strongly against it). Additionally, participants
were eliminated if there was no relation between their endorsement and their estimate
(e.g., they reported being against animal testing, but believed that 100% of their peers
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were in favor of this attitude). Eleven participants were removed from the analyses
regarding the legalization of drugs for the same reasons.
Materials
This experiment was designed to eliminate the selective exposure bias.
Therefore, packets of information were created to inform people about viewpoints for
both positions. For the two 'written' experimental conditions, material was collected
from books, journal articles, and reference sources (e.g., brochures and pamphlets)
which supported both sides of the selected issues (animal testing for medical purposes
and legalization of drugs). These issues were selected based on the size and consistency
of the FCE in pilot studies. Two different combinations were created to control for the
effects of order. Half of the folders presented the supporting information followed by the
opposing information for each issue, while the remaining folders reversed the order
(see Appendices K and L).
A third experimental condition ('video') was also utilized. In this condition,
subjects watched a video of college students engaging in debates surrounding the selected
issues. People volunteered to participate in this debate on the basis of their personal
attitudes in order to ensure controversy and a full coverage of each issue. In this
condition, subjects watched the video clip rather than read any material. This medium of
presentation was hypothesized to be more meaningful and therefore convincing to other
college students.
A control condition was also utilized. In the true control, subjects did not read
any information, but filled out identical questionnaires. This condition was necessary in
order to determine if the manipulations reduce the false consensus bias relative to
subjects who were given no information.
Knowledge quizzes for each condition, except the true control, were also designed
to assess subjects' comprehension of the material. This test served three important
functions: to ensure that subjects read the material carefully, to act as a manipulation
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check to eliminate subjects who failed to process the information, and to reinforce the
dual nature of these issues. For example, one item on the quiz asked subjects to briefly
summarize one benefit and one problem with animal testing. For the experimental
conditions, two different orders were again created to control for the effects of
presentation (See Appendices M and N).
Design
Participants in this experiment were approximately evenly divided between five
conditions; written-animal (N = 57), written-drugs (N = 60), control (N = 56),
video-animal (N = 48), and video-drugs (N = 59). Furthermore, the order of
presentation of the material in the written conditions were fairly evenly split; pro
material followed by anti (N = 57), anti material followed by pro (N = 60). Last, the
order of the knowledge quiz was varied such that 107 subjects completed version A,
while 117 subjects received version B.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the five conditions. For each
condition, except the control group, participants were informed that they would take a
brief quiz tapping their understanding of this material. They were then asked to read the
packet of information or view the videotape. Participants were given fifteen minutes to
read/view the information. After being presented with the material, they completed
several personality measures, including social desirability, social self-esteem, and
self-monitoring, which served as filler items. Upon completion of these scales, all
subjects were given the open-ended test. When all subjects completed the quiz, they
filled out the brief false consensus measure described in Study 2 (consisting only of the
self endorsements and peer estimates), an attitudinal questionnaire, and demographic
information. Participants in the control group were only give the questionnaire with no
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additional information. Last, subjects were debriefed and thanked for their
participation.
Results
It was predicted that the false consensus effect would be reduced in the
intervention conditions. All analyses were conducted separately for the two issues
(“legalization and government regulation of drugs” and “animal testing for medical
purposes”). First, it was necessary to determine if there were any order effects based
on the presentation of the material. To examine this possibility, a 2 (endorsement: for
or against) by 4 (condition: written - Order A; written - Order B; control, and video)
analysis of variance was conducted on each issue to determine if there were any order
effects. The results from this analysis showed that there were no significant differences
between conditions, E (3 ,140) = 1.64, ns for animal testing and F(3, 173) = 1.03, ns
for drug legalization. However, both issues showed a significant effect for endorsement
indicating that false consensus effect was still occurring, F(1,140) = 40.01, g < .001
for animal testing and F(1,1 7 3 ) = 26.32, g < .001 for drug legalization. Additionally,
there was a marginally significant interaction effect, F(3,140) = 2.5 7 , g = .057 for
animal testing such that consensus estimates decreased for people who endorsed an item,
while they increased for individuals who opposed the statement based upon exposure to
the information (see Table 44). The legalization of drugs item did not have a significant
interaction. Because the written experimental groups were not significantly different
and therefore order was not a significant factor, these groups were collapsed, so that all
comparisons will be made between the written, video, and control groups.
To assess the false consensus effect, t-tests were run for each condition to
determine the extent of the false consensus bias. Using a Bonferroni correction to
control for the number of analyses reduced the appropriate significance level to .008.
For both animal testing and the legalization of drugs, the false consensus effect was
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reduced by the manipulation. In fact, it was completely eliminated in the video condition
for both animal testing and the legalization of drugs. Table 44 presents the results of the
t-tests, including the means, standard deviations, number of subjects, the t value and
significance level for each comparison
Table 44
False Consensus Tests for Control. Written, and Video Conditions for “Animal Testing for
Medical Purposes” and “Legalization of Drugs”

Condition

Animal Testina
For
Mean

Control
W ritten
Video

SD

Aaainst
N

6 5 .3 0 (1 8 .0 2 )[3 3 ]
6 5 .1 4 (2 0 .2 2 )[3 7 ]
56.05(1 6.01 )[4 3 ]

Mean

SD

N

2 8 .3 3 (2 0 .0 4 )[1 2]
4 4 .0 9 (1 7 .4 4 )[1 1]
4 6 .0 0 (2 5 .1 0 )[5 ]

t_

£

5.91
3.1 2
1.25

.0 0 0 **
.0 0 3 *
.217

t
4 .3 2
2.62
2 .0 4

£
.0 0 0 **
.0 1 1 *
.0 4 8 *

Leqalization of Druas
Aaainst

For

Control
W ritten
Video

Mean
SD
N
7 9 .1 1 (1 3 .8 1 )[2 8 ]
7 0 .8 0 (2 0 .1 3 )[3 0 ]
7 2 .6 4 (1 3 .3 1 )[3 4 ]

Mean
SD
N
6 0 .2 8 (1 8 .4 7 )[2 8 ]
5 6 .9 0 (2 0 .5 9) [2 9 ]
6 2 .6 0 (2 1 .7 5 )[2 5 ]

< .05. **c < .008.
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In order to determine the statistical effectiveness of the manipulation, effect
sizes (d) were calculated based on each pairwise comparison (Cohen, 1988). As
expected based on the hypothesis, the effect size was affected by the manipulation. The
differences between the groups (people who were for or against each issue) were largest
in the control condition and smallest in the video condition. These values are reported in
Table 45.
Table 45
Effect Size Analysis of Conditions for “Animal Testing for Medical Purposes” and
“Legalization of Drugs”

Condition

Issue
Animal Testing

Legalization of Drugs
Effect size (d)

Control

1.94

1.12

Written

1.01

.67

.57

.57

Video
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The final analysis examined the correlation between participants’ attitudes which
were measured on an 11 point Likert scale ranging from -5 (strongly disagree) to +5
(strongly agree) and their estimates. It was predicted that people’s attitudes should be
highly correlated with their consensus estimates if they are committing the false
consensus error; however, if their estimates are based on information separate from
their personal attitudes, these relations should be weaker. Subsequently, if the
manipulations are reducing the influence of selective exposure by giving people
additional relevant information about the social issues, their estimates might be revised
by this new information. This prediction was supported by an observation of the
correlations between attitudes and estimates, which are presented in Table 46. The
correlations were strongest in the control condition and weakest in the video condition
for both animal testing and the legalization of drugs.
Table 46
Correlations Between Attitude and Estimates for each Condition for “Animal Testing for
Medical Purposes” and “Legalization of Drugs”

Issue
Leaalization of druas

Animal testina
Condition

R

N

R

N

Control

.6 7 * *

45

.4 0 * *

56

W ritten

.5 0 * *

48

.2 8 *

58

.31*

48

.23

59

Video

* f i < .05. **p < .01.
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Discussion
it was hypothesized that the false consensus effect would be reduced by using an
intervention technique designed to eliminate selective exposure to information
supporting participants’ personal beliefs. This prediction was supported. In fact, the
effect was completely eliminated using the video condition, which was unexpected. While
the sample size for the conditions was considerably smaller than previous studies, it was
relative to the control condition to which the groups were compared, therefore, the
results lend strong support to the hypothesis. Examination of the means suggested that
the manipulation works by causing both groups (people for and against each issue) to
converge toward the average estimate as suggested by Marks and Miller (1987).
Analysis of Cohen’s d as a measure of the effect size provides further evidence that the
manipulation was effective. Effect size analyses are independent of sample size, thus the
results showed that the group differences were becoming smaller, as their estimates
were converging regardless of the number of subjects in the groups. For both topics, the
effect size for the control groups was very large, while the video conditions had medium
effect sizes as established by Cohen’s effect size conventions (Cohen, 1988).
Furthermore, these analyses provided evidence for the hypothesis that the video
condition would be the most effective form of presentation. While it was not possible to
determine if the increased effectiveness was attributable to changes in participants’
motivational states, it might be a testable hypothesis for the future. If the video medium
was most effective because it showed peers discussing the topics, perhaps a transcript of
the debate emphasizing the nature of the participants would be equally effective. By
designing a study in which two additional conditions were added; a written condition
based on the transcript of a peer debate and a video condition presenting authority
figures describing the various viewpoints, it might be possible to partial out the effects
of medium of presentation and the effects of the reference group. This type of study
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would also enable researchers to determine if the false consensus effect was more
affected by cognitive or motivational biases.
Overall, this experiment provided evidence and hope that intervention strategies
can be effectively directed at students’ misperceptions about social norms. By reducing
the false consensus effect, subjects are less likely to base their estimates of peers’
beliefs on their own attitudes; rather they are using other available information to
make this decision, if they are exposed to information which revises the normative
influence, it might help to eliminate problem behaviors on campus.
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V. GENERAL DISCUSSION

Overall, these studies demonstrated that people make systematic errors in
identifying social norms concerning social issues. Evidence suggests that people
consistently exhibit the false consensus bias (Mullen e t al., 1985; Ross, Greene, &
House, 1977) in which they perceive their positions are relatively more common than
alternate beliefs. Study 1 demonstrated that this effect was also evident for social
issues, regardless of manipulations in the wording or order of presentation. This finding
might be due in part to people's lack of awareness about these topics or to selective
exposure to a restricted homogenous sample. While various viewpoints were
represented on all of the issues (i.e., there were people who were pro-choice and pro
life in the study), individuals who hold different beliefs may not be affiliating on campus
as people tend to be friends with people who hold similar attitudes. Another explanation
might be that people simply have a greater understanding of their personal viewpoints.
Because attitudes are predominately internal traits, which may not be manifested in
outward behavior, it is easy to see how people might have difficulty estimating the
opinions of their peers. In fact, people were more likely to commit the FCE for
attitudinal rather than behavioral items. Many of the false consensus studies have
examined external characteristics, such as physical traits (e.g., eye color) or behavior
(e.g., Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; Marks & Miller, 1987). In these cases,
individuals do not have greater access to their own personal characteristics or actions.
Study 2 examined if these biases were a significant predictor of people's
behavioral intentions related to these beliefs. Using Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975)
theory of reasoned action as a model, it was predicted that the degree to which people
demonstrate false consensus would influence their behavioral intentions on each issue.
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This measure controlled for participants' personal position on each item by asking
people to rate their attitude for each issue. It was demonstrated that the inclusion of the
FCE measure did account for additional variance in explaining behavioral intentions.
Because people's perceptions of social norms do seem to influence their self-reported
behavioral intentions (and presumably actual behavior related to each issue), it is
important to correct these inaccurate beliefs. Therefore, Study 3 was designed to reduce
the false consensus effect
While a substantial number of researchers have suggested that selective
exposure leads to a false consensus bias, no studies to date have attempted to reduce false
consensus directly by eliminating the selective exposure effect The final study in this
experiment addressed these concerns. It was proposed that exposing subjects to both
sides of the issue would make the alternative position salient, thereby reducing false
consensus for both the written and video groups. However, it was argued that
motivational explanations might better explain the discrepancies, in which case the
manipulation would be less effective in the written condition, which presented only
statistical information from experts in the field. The findings suggested that both
methods effectively reduced the bias, but the video presentation had a greater impact,
which implies that both cognitive and motivational biases play a role in false consensus.
Future research will need to be conducted in order to more definitively state the cause of
the FCE.
Limitations
This series of studies is prone to several limitations. First, Study 2 examined
behavioral intentions, rather than actual behavior. Using such a broad scope of social
issues necessitates the use of behavioral intentions rather than actual behaviors due to
the inherent difficulty in collecting the relevant data. Researchers wishing to focus on
specific topics might find the resources required to collect accurate behavioral data, but
employing a range of issues limits the research to intentions. Additionally, some of the
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topics are highly sensitive, such as drug use, which prohibits the use of actual
behavioral measures. However, Fishbein and Ajzen (1 9 7 5 ) have demonstrated that
behavioral intentions are a good predictor of behavior (see also van den Putte, 1991).
Furthermore, it is not possible to establish cause and effect relations using the
false consensus paradigm. Utilizing regression analyses can assess the relative
contribution of a number of variables, including the impact of the degree to which they
display false consensus, but it is not possible to randomly assign people to a biased
position. Therefore, this research only addresses the relative impact of false consensus
on behavioral intentions, while not making any causal predictions. However, previous
longitudinal research has demonstrated that people who overestimate the percentage of
people who engage in a particular behavior, such as smoking are more likely to smoke or
begin smoking (Chassin e t al.,1984). This longitudinal evidence suggests that these
misperceptions do shape future behavior.
Future Directions
In order to address more clearly the questions examined by this research, future
studies need to be conducted. For example, it would be helpful to assess the media’s role
in shaping social norms for college students. Careful examination of exposure to media
sources might provide important information regarding the source of college students’
beliefs. In a recent course assignment, students were asked to write on their views
regarding homosexual marriage. Several students cited the MTV show “The Real World”
as the source of their beliefs on this issue. Educators should not underestimate the
impact that media has on students and future research should more carefully examine its
long-term effects on normative beliefs. Moreover, longitudinal studies which examine
behavior should also be conducted in order to determine which social groups actually
have the most influence in determining social norms, rather than relying on students’
perceptions. Furthermore, this type of extended study would allow researchers to
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determine if normative influences and various intervention techniques have lasting
effects.
Another interesting question addresses the age groups for which these findings
are most evident Much of the research has examined adolescents and college students,
while neglecting older adults. College students might want to feel unique or distinct
(Fromkin, 1972) from their peers at this point in the life, whereas older individuals
may not display this tendency. On the other hand, college-aged students might want to
protect their self-esteem by assuming that their peers share their viewpoints. To
answer this question, longitudinal studies or studies on different aged populations might
be informative.
Further research also needs to be conducted in order to determine if motivational
versus cognitive explanations best account for the false consensus bias. While it is
extremely difficult to separate these two influences, it might be possible to identify
which intervention techniques are most effective and then establish which influence was
the larger contributor. This method is similar to trying various neurotransmitterbased drugs in an attem pt to narrow down the potential causes of various diseases (e.g.,
attention-deficit disorder). Using this method might allow practical intervention
techniques to be developed while also answering a basic research question.
While false consensus did not appear to function as a individual difference
variable to predict people’s behavioral intentions (i.e., TFCE) (Krueger & Zeiger,
1993), it might work in different domains, such as abilities, personal preferences, or
personality traits. Therefore, it would be an interesting question to address in the
future by measuring this general tendency using different types of items.
Implications
This type of research has important implications. Intervention programs aimed
at correcting social problems should include a technique used to reduce misperceptions.
Previous research has found that correcting misperceptions can lead to changes in
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behavior (see Kelly et al.„ 1991, 1992; Trafimow, 1994). If people can be made
aware of the false consensus bias, it might cause them to rethink their actions and more
carefully consider the ramifications of their behavior.
Norman and Tedeschi (1989) argued that in order for intervention techniques to
be successful, they must focus on normative thinking as well as individual attitudes.
They designed an intervention plan to combat teen smoking, which included a medical
component, which addressed the negative health of effects of cigarettes and a social
identity component which emphasized the negative image associated with smokers. While
their intervention was not successful, the research did suggest that the normative
component is equally important in trying to change adolescents’ perceptions o f smoking;
simply knowing “the facts” is not sufficient to deter them from adopting a habit that
they perceive will make them more socially acceptable. Additional support was garnered
by Gibbons, Gerrard, and McCoy’s (1 9 95 ) research on pregnancy prevention in
adolescent girls. They found evidence that girls’ perceptions of their peers, in the form
of the “unwed mother prototype” did predict their willingness to engage in unprotected
sex, regardless of their attitudes toward birth control. Similar research examined
health risks in college students, which demonstrated that prototype perception was
related to risk behaviors, such as drinking and driving (see Gibbons & Gerrard, 1995),
such that perceptions guided behaviors and behaviors shaped perceptions. Gibbons and
his colleagues have also noted that self-esteem plays a role in these types of decisions
(Gibbons, Eggleston, & Benthin, 1997). Furthermore, they argued that educators
trying to reduce the risk of these behaviors should focus on the peer image being
portrayed.
This advice is particularly relevant given the differential impact of various
groups on establishing normative behaviors. Because of the powerful impact o f the
media, commercials directed at adolescents can leave very lasting impressions,
especially if they are portraying behaviors as desirable and leading to increased
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acceptance. Advertisements for beer and cigarettes aimed at teenagers are especially
dangerous because they are capitalizing on the peer model; they repeatedly show young,
attractive, healthy individuals engaging in fun activities. On the other hand, public
service commercials rarely use this approach, instead they rely heavily on scientific
and medical evidence to make their point. If they could effectively change the image
associated with the behaviors using relevant peer groups, they would have a greater
impact on teenagers. Recent appeals do seem to be addressing this concern. A recent
anti-smoking commercial shows a young women whose life has been ruined by
cigarettes; she has emphysema, had a lung-removed, and must take medicine which has
caused physical deformities. While the facts alone would probably not alter teens’
behavior, she mentions that she began smoking to look older and concludes that it worked.
As she is making this statement, they show a picture of a young attractive girl who looks
nothing like the woman speaking. Hopefully, this commercial will decrease the imagepromoting appeal of cigarettes. Similarly, announcements which use popular television
stars might serve a similar purpose by creating a desirable social image associated with
safer behaviors (e.g., abstinence).
Conclusion
Last, it is important to address the question: Has this research provided support
for the key assumptions related to norm perception? The social influence literature
provides compelling evidence that people do in fact base their behavior and attitudes on
social norms (e.g., Asch, 1955; Festinger, 1954; Newcomb, 1943; Sherif, 1936).
Furthermore, this research has clearly demonstrated that people perceive their
parents, peers, and the media to have the greatest impact on their beliefs. However,
consistent with previous research (e.g., Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), people make
systematic biases in their estimation of normative beliefs, namely they overestimate
support for their personal position (i.e., demonstrate the false consensus bias).
Finally, these misperceptions do influence people's behavioral intentions. Consistent
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with Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1 9 7 5 ) theory of reasoned action, the findings suggest that
the degree to which people overestimate support for their position relative to people who
hold an opposing view does impact their likelihood to engage in certain acts. Thus, people
are not reporting that they will behave solely according to their attitudes, but rather
their misperceptions are also shaping their intended actions. Consequently, people's
interpretations of social norms incorrectly bias their responses and potentially their
behavior. Therefore, it is especially important to develop techniques to correct this
bias, which was successfully demonstrated by the manipulation utilized in the final
study.
In sum, this research addresses many important issues related to current social
norms, including examining the development of norms, their impact on behavior, and
ways to eliminate detrimental effects of false beliefs. A clear understanding of the
source and influence of norms for attitudes will enable psychologists to better cope with
social problems. Ideally, this research should lead to intervention techniques designed to
correct misperceptions. In closing, the social value of this research should not be
overlooked.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:

COLLEGE STUDENTS' OPINIONS CONCERNING CONTROVERSIAL
SOCIAL ISSUES

We are interested in college students' beliefs about various social issues. Please
take a few minutes to tell us your position on each topic. Circle yes or no to indicate
your stance on each issue.
We would also like to get a measure of the impact of various groups on your
position. So, for each issue, check all of the groups that you think have influenced
the source of your beliefs about that topic using the following scale:
A=Parents
B=Siblings
C=Other relatives
D=Close friends

I AM IN FAVOR OF:

A

B

C

E=Dating partners/spouses
F=Other college students
G=Religious figures
H=Media (e.g., TV,papers)

D

E

F

G

1. The right for a woman to
NO
choose an abortion.
YES
2. The right for a person to
have an assisted suicide
NO
(e.g., Dr. Kevorkian).YES
3. The option to choose the death
penalty for criminals.YES
NO
4. Animal research for
medical purposes.
YES

NO

5. Animal research for
cosmetics.
YES

NO

6. The right for homosexual
couples to adopt children.
YES
NO
7. Legalization and government
regulation of drugs. YES
NO
8. Pornography on the Internet.
YES
NO
9. The use of the insanity plea
in court.
YES NO
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H

APPENDIX A (cont.)

A=Parents
B=SibIings
C=Other relatives
D=Close friends

E=Dating partners/spouses
F=Other college students
G=Reiigious figures
H=Media (e.g., TV, papers)

AM IN FAVOR OF:

H

10. “Gays in the military”
YES
NO
11. Lower drinking age to 18.
YES
NO
12. U.S. government money spent
on aid to foreign countries.
YES
NO
13. Mandatory seatbelt law.
YES
NO

14. Ban on automatic gun sales.
YES
NO
15. Ban on public smoking.
YES
NO
16. Women allowed in combat.
YES
NO
17. Free condom distribution
in high schools.
YES
NO
18. Affirmative action (racial
quotas for employment.
YES
NO
19. The right for homosexuals
to legally marry.
YES
NO
20. Enforced prayer in
public schools.
YES

NO
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APPENDIX B:

COLLEGE STUDENTS' OPINIONS CONCERNING CONTROVERSIAL
SOCIAL ISSUES - PEER ESTIMATES

We are interested in college students' beliefs about various social issues. Please
take a few minutes to tell us what percentage of UNH students that you believe are i_n
fa v o r of each issue. Therefore, you should give a number ranging from 0 to 100,
representing the percentage of your peers that you believe s u p p o rt that position.
Next, we would like to get a measure of your confidence in your judgment. On a
scale from 1 (very uncertain) to 5 (very certain), please rate your estimates.
WHAT PERCENTAGE OF UNH STUDENTS ARE
IN FAVOR OF:

Very
uncertain

The right for a woman to choose an abortion.

2

3

4

5

The right for a person to have an assisted suicide
(e.g., Dr. Kevorkian).

2

3

4

5

The option to choose death penalty for criminals.

2

3

4

5

Animal research for medical purposes.

2

3

4

5

Animal research for cosmetics.

2

3

4

5

The right for homosexual couples to
adopt children.

2

3

4

5

Legalization and government regulation of drugs.

2

3

4

5

Pornography on Internet.

2

3

4

5

The use of the insanity plea in court.

2

3

4

5

"Gays in military."

2

3

4

5

Lower drinking age to age 18.

2

3

4

5

US government money spent on aid
to foreign countries

2

3

4

5

Mandatory seatbelt law

2

3

4

5

Ban on automatic gun sales.

2

3

4

5

Ban on public smoking.

2

3

4

5

Women allowed in combat

2

3

4

5

Free condom distribution in high schools.

2

3

4

5

Very
certain
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APPENDIX B (c o n t.)

Affirmative action (racial quotas for employment. ____________ 1

2

3

____________ 1

2

3

1

2

3

The right for homosexuals to legally marry.
Enforced prayer in public schools.
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APPENDIX C:

CONTROVERSIAL SITUATIONS

If you were in the following situations, decide how likely you would be to take the
following actions. Again, you are not rating how likely it is that you would be in a given
situation, but imagine that you are in this situation and decide how likely you would be to
take each action. Please rate each response on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very
lik e ly ).
VERY UNLIKELY
UNSURE
VERY LIKELY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Go with a friend who was having an abortion.

VERY
UNLIKELY
1 2 3 4

VERY
LIKELY
5 6 7

Help a relative who desired an assisted suicide.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Choose the death penalty for a convicted rapist and murderer.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Donate money to animal research for cancer.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Buy health care (e.g., shampoo, mascara) products
tested on animals.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Give up a child for adoption to a gay couple.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Smoke marijuana.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Allow a young relative access to pornography on the Internet.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Vote on a jury that a criminal was insane.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Vote for a law opposing gays in the military.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Buy beer for an underaged (under 21) friend.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Vote for a bill which allocates 10% of taxes
for aid to foreign countries.

1 2

3

4

5 6 7

Drive a car without wearing a seatbelt.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Sign a petition banning gun sales.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Go only to 'non-smoking' restaurants and bars.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Convince a female friend that she should not fight in combat.

1 2 3

Distribute free condoms to high school seniors.

4

5 6 7

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Work for a company that hires based on racial quotas.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Attend a homosexual wedding.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7

Leave the school room during prayer time.

1 2

3 4

5 6 7
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APPENDIX D:

CONTROVERSIAL SITUATIONS - PEER ESTIMATES

For each of the following situations, answer if you would engage in the behavior.
Then, estimate what percentage of UNH students peers would engage in each behavior on a
scale from 0 to 100%.
WOULD YOU:

PEER ESTIMATE(%)

Go with a friend who was having an abortion.

YES

NO

Help a relative who desired an assisted suicide.

YES

NO

Choose the death penalty for a convicted
rapist and murderer.

YES

NO

Donate money to animal research for cancer.

YES

NO

Buy health care (e.g., shampoo, mascara)
products tested on animals.

YES

NO

Give up a child for adoption to a gay couple.

YES

NO

Smoke marijuana.

YES

NO

Allow a young relative access to pornography
on the Internet.

YES

NO

Vote on a jury that a criminal was insane.

YES

NO

Vote for a law opposing gays in the military.

YES

NO

Buy beer for an underaged (under 21) friend.

YES

NO

Vote for a bill which allocates 10% of taxes
for aid to foreign countries.

YES

NO

Drive a car without wearing a seatbelt.

YES

NO

Sign a petition banning gun sales.

YES

NO

Go only to 'non-smoking' restaurants and bars.

YES

NO

Convince a female friend that she should not fight in combat
YES
NO
Distribute free condoms to high school seniors.
YES
NO
Work for a company that hires based on racial quotas.
YES
Attend a homosexual wedding.
YES

NO
NO

YES

NO

Leave the school room during prayer time.
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APPENDIX E:

ATTITUDES

Now we would like to get a measure of your degree of support for each topic. We
would like you to rate the strength of your stance (e.g., do you strongly oppose abortion
or are you mildly pro-choice?) on each issue. Please rate your attitude on a scale from
-5 (strongly oppose) to +5 (strongly agree) with 0 meaning that you feel completely
neutral about the issue.
RATING
STRONGLY
STRONGLY
OPPOSE
AGREE
Right for a woman to choose an abortion.
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
1 2 3
4 5
Right for a person to have an assisted
suicide (e.g., Dr. Kevorkian).

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Option to choose death penalty for criminals.
-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Animal research for medical purposes.

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Animal research for cosmetics.

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

The right for homosexual couples to adopt children.
-5 -4 -3
Legalization and government regulation of drug sales.
-5 -4 -3
Freedom for pornography on the Internet.

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

The use of the insanity plea in court.

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

"Gays in military."

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Lower drinking age to age 18.

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

U.S. government money spent on aid to foreign countries.
-5 -4 -3 -2
Mandatory seatbelt law.
-5 -4 -3 -2

-1
-1

0
0

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

Ban on automatic gun sales.

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Ban on public smoking.

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Women allowed in combat.

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Free condom distribution in high schools.

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Affirmative action (racial quotas for employment).
-5 -4 -3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

The right for homosexuals to legally marry. -5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Enforced prayer in public schools.

-4

-3

4

5

-5

-2

-1

0

1

2

3
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APPENDIX F:

SOURCE OF SOCIAL NORMS QUESTIONNAIRE

We would like to assess the importance of these groups. For each of the following
sources, please rate the impact that they had on the development of your personal
beliefs.

Not at all
influential

Very
influential

Parents

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Siblings

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Grandparents

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Close friends

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

4

5

6

7

Significant others (e.g., boyfriend or girlfriend, spouse)
1

2

Other college students

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Teachers

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Religious figures (e.g., priests)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Television

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Newspapers

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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APPENDIX G: SOCIAL DESIRABILITY (C row ne & M arlowe,

1960)

Below are a number of statement concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read
each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you.
T

F

I
T

F
F

T
T
T
T
T
T

F
F
F
F
F
F

T

F

T
T

F
F

T
T
T
T
T
T

F
F
F
F
F
F

T
T
T
T
T
T

F
F
F
F
F
F

T
T

F
F

T
T

F
F

T
T
T
T

F
F
F
F

T

F

1. Before voting, I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the
candidates.
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
3. It is sometimes haid for me to go on with my work if I am not
encouraged.
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way.
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress.
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in arestaurant.
9. if I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I wasnot seen, I
would probably do it.
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought
too little of my ability.
11 . 1 like to gossip at times.
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in
authority even though I knew they were right.
13. No matter who I am talking to, I'm always a good listener.
14. I can remember'playing sick1to get out of something.
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
17. I always try to practice what I preach.
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud-mouthed,
obnoxious people.
19. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it.
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my
wrongdoings.
25. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different
from my own.
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of
others.
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
3 1 . 1 have never felt that I was punished without cause.
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune, they only got what
they deserved.
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's
feelings.
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APPENDIX H:

SELF-MONITORING SCALE (Snyder,

1974)

The statements that follow concern your personal reactions to a number of
different situations. No two statements are exactly alike, so consider each statement
carefully before answering. If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE as applied to
you, circle ' T to the left of the statement. If the statement is FALSE or MOSTLY
FALSE as applied to you, circle 'F' to the left of the statement. It is important that you
answer as frankly and honestly as you can.
T

F

1 .1 find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.

T

F

2. My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings,
attitudes, and beliefs.

T

F

3. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that
others will like.

T

F

4. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.

T

F

5 .1 can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have no
information.

T

F

6. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.

T

F

7. When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of
others for cues.

T

F

8. I would probably make a good actor.

T

F

9. I rarely seek the advice of my friends to choose movies,books, or
music.

T

F

10. I sometimes appear to others to be experiencing deeper emotions that
I actually am.

T

F

11. 1 laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than alone.

T

F

12. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.

T

F

13. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very
different persons.

T

F

14. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.

T

F

15. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good
time.

T

F

16. I'm not always the person I appear to be.

T

F

17. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to
please someone else or win their favor.
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APPENDIX H (c o n t.)

T

F

18. I have considered being an entertainer.

T

F

19. In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me
to be rather than anything else.

T

F

20. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational
acting.

T

F

21.1 have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and
different situations.

T

F

22. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.

T

F

23. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite so well as I
should.

T

F

24. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a
right end).

T

F

25. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
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APPENDIX I: Texas Social Behavior inventory (Helm reich & Stapp, 1 9 7 4 )
Please read each item carefully and circle the number that best describes your
beliefs.
0
NOT AT ALL
CHARACTERISTIC
OF ME

1
NOT
VERY

2

3
FAIRLY

SLIGHTLY

4
VERY MUCH
CHARACTERISTIC
OF ME

1. 1am not likely to speak to people until they speak to me.
0
1

2

3

4

2. 1would describe myself as self-confident.

0

1

2

3

4

3. 1feel confident of my appearance.

0

1

2

3

4

4. 1am a good mixer.

0

1

2

3

4

5. When in a group of people, 1have difficulty thinking of the right thing to say.
2
3
4
0
1
6. When in a group of people, 1usually do what the others want rather than make
suggestions.
0
1 2
3
4
7. When I am in a disagreement with other people, my opinion usually prevails.
0
1 2
3
4
8. I would describe myself as one who attempts to master situations.
0
1 2

3

4

9. Other people look up to me.

0

1

2

3

4

10. I enjoy social gatherings just to be with peopie.O

1

2

3

4

11. 1 make apoint of looking other people in the eye.O

1

2

3

4

12. I cannot seem to get others to notice me.

1

2

3

4

3

4

0

13. I would rather not have very much responsibility for other people.
0
1 2

14. I feel comfortable being approached by someone in a position of authority.
1
2
3
0

4

15. 1would describe myself as indecisive.

0

1

2

3

4

16. 1have no doubts about my social competence.

0

1

2

3

4

1would describe myself as socially unskilled. 0

1

2

3

4

17.
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APPENDIX

0
NOT AT ALL
CHARACTERISTIC
OF ME

1
NOT
VERY

I (c o n t.)

2

3
4
FAIRLY
VERY MUCH
CHARACTERISTIC
OF ME

SLIGHTLY

18. I frequently find it difficult to defend my point of view when confronted with the
opinions of others.
0
1 2
3
4
19. I would be willing to describe myself as a pretty 'strong' personality.
0
1 2
3
20. When I work on a committee, I like to take charge of things.
0
1 2
21. 1 usually expect to succeed in the things I do.

0

1

4

3
2

3

22. I feel comfortable approaching someone in a position of authority over me.
0
1 2
3
23. I enjoy being around other people, and seek out social encounters frequently.
0
1 2
3
24.

Ifeel confident of my social behavior.

0

1

2

3

25. I feel I can confidently approach and deal with anyone I meet.
0
1 2
26. I would describe myself as happy.
27.

0

Ienjoy being in front of large audiences.

0

1
1

3
2

2

3
3

4

28. When I meet a stranger, I often think that he is better than I am.
0
1 2

3

4

29. It is hard for me to start a conversation with strangers.
0
1

3

4

30. People seem naturally to turn to me when decisions have to be made.
0
1 2

3

4

31.

Ifeel secure in social situations.

0

1

2

3

4

32.

Ilike to exert my influence over other people. 0

1

2

3

4

2
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APPENDIX J: DEMOGRAPHICS
Please answer the following questions about yourself.
1. My age is.
2. My gender is _

years old.
male or

female.

3. I am a college

. freshman
. junior
.graduate

4. My religion is

. Catholic
Jewish
Other (please specify):

5. My race is

.Caucasian

sophomore
. senior
. other
Protestant

_

. African
American
. Hispanic

. Asian
_
. Native American
. Other (please specify):
6 . My major is
7. My SAT scores were.

Verbal and

Math

8. My overall G.P.A. (grade point average) is
For the next two questions, please choose one of the following responses.
9.

.a. I believe that I am similar to most of my peers.
_b. I believe that I am different from most of my peers.

10 ..

_ a. In general, I think that most college students try to be similar to their
peers.
_ b. In general, I think that most college students try to be unique from their
peers.
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APPENDIX K:

STUDY 3

ANIMAL RESEARCH
AGAINST
"Fifty million animals are killed annually in U.S. labs for medical and scientific
research. People who support animal research have always reduced the debate to the
idea that the only hope for human beings with horrible diseases lies in discovering a
cure through animal research. But today the truth of the matter is that animal research
is unnecessary."
In the late 1800s, researchers made convincing arguments that animal
experimentation was indispensable to human health because it was primarily concerned
with germs and infectious diseases, such as malaria and smallpox. In the past two
decades, this emphasis has changed. Infectious diseases have been replaced by noninfectious, chronic degenerative diseases, such as cancer, strokes, heart attacks,
diabetes, AIDS, and drug addiction. Most of these illnesses are tied to a complex set of
factors including lifestyle, heredity, and the environment. These diseases are
completely different from infectious diseases, which are caused by a single germ which
can be isolated and treated accordingly. However, the medical field has stood by the
animal testing model despite its inapplicability to the diseases of today. Billions of tax
dollars are spent by scientists attempting to create animal models of every conceivable
human problem, including sexual impotence and manic depression.
Five billion dollars are spent annually in government grants paid by taxpayers
for medical research. All of this money is not helping to eliminate the major health
crises of today. Cancer death rates have increased for decades. The 1985 death rate of
461,000 is 4 times the annual total from 50 years ago. Heart disease kills 770,000
each year. Even though cancer and heart disease are known to be up to 80% preventable,
they are the areas in which the most tax dollars are spent and the most animals killed.
This misdirection of resources is causing America to fall behind in medical advances
(20th in male life expectancy, 23rd in infant mortality). Instead of creating diseases in
animals, researchers should be preventing them in humans.
You can't mimic human diseases in animals because of the physiological
differences in species. Furthermore, the spontaneous disease process can't be studied in
animals which are methodically given the diseases. Lavish amounts of money are spent
on carcinogencity studies in animals to identify substances likely to cause cancer in
humans. Mice and rats are most often used. A recent study found that 46% of substances
deemed carcinogenic in one were safe in the other. So, how can we apply these findings to
people. Also, if we can't understand the cause, what about finding a cure?
Drugs found effective in animals need not work in people. Eleven billion dollars
have been spend on cancer research, but animal experimentation has not produced a
single substantial advance in the prevention or treatment of cancer. Of the 10 most
effective cancer drugs, not one was discovered through animal experimentation. Despite
years of epidemiological studies and autopsy results showing that cigarette smoking
causes lung cancer, health warnings were delayed and thousands died because of the
difficulty in inducing smoking-caused cancer in lab animals.
SOURCE: This information was taken directly from Steve Siegal, an animals rights
activist. Utne Reader 10:47-49, S/O, 1989
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ANIMAL RESEARCH
FOR
"We have witnessed an extraordinary outpouring of new drugs, devices, and
procedures to relieve human suffering and save lives," says Dr. Edward N. Brant, Jr.,
former Reagan Administration Assistant Secretary for Health and Human Services.
"Very few of these advancements - maybe none of them - would have been possible
without the use of vertebrate animals somewhere along the research path."
Knowledgeable people agree. Judy Rosner, executive director of the United Parkinson
Foundation, says "there is no way that further research can be done on Parkinson's
disease without laboratory animals." Adds Dr. Leon Stemfeld, medical director of the
United Cerebral Palsy Research and Education Foundation, "Without animal research, the
various types of preventative measures that we now have would not have been possible."
To date, 41 Nobel prizes have been awarded to scientists whose achievements
depended, at least in part, on using lab animals. Vaccines against polio, diphtheria,
mumps, measles, rubella and smallpox would not have been possible without such
experiments. Techniques such as open heart surgeiy, brain surgery, coronary bypass,
organ transplants, and correction of congenital heart disease were developed with the
assistance of animal research. Insulin to control diabetes and medications for asthma,
epilepsy, arthritis, ulcers, and hypertension were created using animal research. It is
safe to say that if you are an American alive today, you most likely have benefited from
animal research.
Animal research has played a vital role in the treatment of heart disease, the
leading cause (nearly 40%) of deaths in the U.S. As a result of studies into causes,
treatment, and prevention, the number of women killed by heart disease has declined by
two percent a year since the early 1950s, while the number of men dying has been
declining by the same rate since the late 1960s. Dr. John Powell, an associate professor
at Harvard University and president of the Massachusetts Heart Association claims that
"heart disease is the number one killer in this country, and researchers trying to do
something about the problem are having their hands tied [by animal rights activists]."
Often, the animal rightists are, at best, misinformed. They claim that the
number of animals used in scientific experiments is increasing; figures offered range
up to 100 million animals used annually. In fact, the only recent study of biomedical
research was issued by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment and states that, by the
best current estimates, the number of animals used is between 17 and 22 million, which
is a decline from 38 million in 1968, according to a study by the National Academy of
Sciences.
In addition, animal rights activists repeatedly imply that experiments are
performed on pets. Actually, approximately 90% of the animals used in research are
rats, mice, and other rodents, while less than 1% are dogs and cats. Another
misconception purports that other research methods can replace the use of animals in
biomedical research. Unfortunately, there are no real alternatives to the use of animals
in biomedical research. Some developments such as tissue and cell cultures and
computer models have supplemented animal research, but these techniques cannot
replace the use of live animals. Therefore, animal research is essential, but it is
carefully controlled and regulated.
SOURCE: Material taken directly from Frankie L. Trull, president of the Foundation for
Biomedical Research, NY. Reprinted from USA today, March 1988, p.52
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APPENDIX L:

STUDY 3

LEGALIZATION OF DRUGS
FOR
The drug trade has created enormous opportunities for organized crime. A report
by Wharton Econometrics for the President's Commission on Organized Crime identified
the sale of illicit drugs as the source of more than half of all organized crime revenues.
The involvement of organized crime has led to well-publicized levels of violence that
have become everyday fare in the drug trade.
Enormous profits have made widespread corruption in law enforcement all but
inevitable. One conservative estimate is that at least 3 0 percent of the nation's police
officers have had some form of involvement with illicit drugs since becoming employed
in law enforcement The motivation for succumbing to corruption will remain
overwhelming as long as staggering sums of money are offered as an alternative to
risking one's life in effective efforts to prevent relatively minor offenses.
Furthermore, billions of dollars are spent each year on law enforcement in an attem pt to
eliminate drug trafficking. Courts and jails have become clogged as a result of "get
tough" policies toward drug offenders. Federal courts have become 'drug courts', where
narcotics prosecutions now account for 44 percent of ail criminal trials, up 229
percent in the past decade.
Many drugs tend to be expensive not because of their production costs, but
because of their illegality. According to one estimate, the price of heroin is
approximately two hundred times greater than it would be under a free market of supply
and demand. As a result, many users commit property offenses in order to obtain money
to buy drugs. Legal drugs would be cheaper, so users would be less likely to commit
crimes to purchase them.
Removal of the enormous profits in the sale of illegal drugs might motivate
persons to better prepare themselves to make an honest living. The existence of a
lucrative black market for drugs may have contributed more to deterioration in
education than the drugs themselves.
Making drugs illegal may glamorize drugs by creating the "forbidden fruit"
phenomenon. Illegality stimulates curiosity and desire, especially among persons who
regard themselves as unconventional and rebellious. A fter marijuana was
decriminalized in the Netherlands, one writer commented, "Decriminalization of
marijuana makes marijuana boring."
The interest in minimizing availability has discouraged illegal drugs from being
used for legitimate medical purposes. Doctors are unable to prescribe marijuana to
patients suffering from debilitating diseases such as cancer, glaucoma, and multiple
sclerosis, where it has been shown to have beneficial effects.
Medical complications of drug consumption have been compounded by
criminalization. Many drug users have died from complications resulting from impure
supplies. Furthermore, drug users are reluctant to seek treatment because of the stigma
of illegality. The night that basketball star Len Bias died of heart failure after using
cocaine, his friends, fearing the police, waited until his third seizure before calling an
ambulance.
SOURCE: This material was taken directly from Douglas H. Husak, Drugs and Rights,
1992
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LEGALIZATION OF DRUGS
AGAINST
Drug use should be prohibited because it is harmful to users themselves.
Legalizing drugs would make them more accessible and compound their negative effects.
The table presented below gives details concerning the detrimental effects of various
illicit drugs. (Source: Alcohol and Other Drugs: Risky Business, American College
Health Association).
I Drag Type

Name

Most Common Complications/Long-Term Effects

Benzedrine. Dexedrine
M ethedrine. diet puls,
MDMA (Erstacy)

Nervousness. paranoia, hauucnations. dizziness, tremors, deceased mental ability,
sexual impotence, insomnia, skin disorders, malnutrition, delusions, psychosis, seizures,
death

Cocaine*

cocaine pow cer, c a c k ,
freesased coke

Tremors, nasal bieeding and infammation. toxic psychosis, seizures, damage to nasal
septum and bicod vessels, death from overdose (hear: cr respirator,- failure}

Nicotine

cigarettes, cigars, pipes,
snuff, chewing tobacco

H igh biccc pressure, emphysema, bronchitis, heart and iur.g disease, cancer, death.

Caffeine

Coffee, coia. r.o*Doz, ter

Nervousness, insomnia, dehycradon. stomach imitation, fatigue

beer, w ine, licucr, some
medications

Dehydration, hangover, overdose or mixing with other depressants can cause respiratory failure, obesity, impotence, psychcsis. ulcers, malnutrition, liver and brain damage,
delirium tam ers, death

Tranquilizers*

Vaiium, librium ,
Equanil. Miiicwn,
Thorazine

Hangover, m enstual irregularities, increases or deceases efr'ec of other cm tp .
especially dangerous with alcohol, destroys biccd ceils, jaundice, coma, death

Barbiturates*

Nembutal, Ajr.ytai,
Seconal, pher.ccarbital

Lethargy, hangover, fciurred vision, nausea, depresrion. seizures, excessive sleepiness,
confusion, irritability, severe withdrawal sickness; can be fetal if mixed w ith alcohoi or
other depressants

Narcotics’

Heroine, morphine,
opium, codeine,
methadone. Demerol

Respirator.- and crculatcrv deutessicn. d :~ 'n e ss. vomidne. sweatins. dr,- mouth,
lowered libido, lethargy, consriparion, weigh: less, temporary sterility and impotence,
withdrawal sickness, stupor, death.

Inhalants’

amyl nitrate, butyl
nitrate, nitrous oxide,
glue an d paint

Nitrates, headache, dizriness, acc^-m tsd heart rate, nausea, nasal criterion, couch. Ics:
erecdon, hallucnadons; liver, kidney, fccne-marrow and brain damage; death

Marijuana, hashish,
TKC

Impaired driving a'cilir/, pcssibie lung damage, reduced sperm count and sperm
mcriiity; damage from impure dose

LSD, psiiccycin. MDA,
peyote, DNfT, ST?

Depression, paranoia, physical exhausricr after use. psychosis ("freaidng cud*)
exaggerated body distcrrieo: fears of death, flashback, adverse drug rescuer., psychosis

Stimulants
Amphet2~ir.es*

Depressants
. Alcohoi*

*

K alludncger.
Psychedelics
Cannabis*

* Impair- driving
abiiicv
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'1

APPENDIX L (c o n t.)

In tests conducted during the last eight years at Manhattan Central Booking,
between 60 and 83 percent of arrestees have tested positive for cocaine. This statistic
suggests that there might be a strong connection between crime and drug use. (Source:
William J. Bratton, Commissioner of the New York City Police, Boston Globe, December
24, 1995).
The NIDA Drug Abuse Warning Network reported an estimated 400,000
admissions to hospital emergency rooms nationwide that involved drug abuse in 1991. A
total of 6,601 drug-abuse related deaths were reported in 1991 by 130 medical
examiners in 27 metropolitan areas. (Source: 1994 World Almanac, Funk and
Wagnalls Corporation)
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APPENDIX M:

STUDY 3

KNOWLEDGE QUIZ (A )
1. Name three accomplishments which were not possible without the assistance of
animal research.

2. List two arguments discussed which suggest that animal testing is unnecessary.

KNOWLEDGE QUIZ (B)
1. List two arguments discussed which suggest that animal testing is unnecessary.

2. Name three accomplishments which were not possible without the assistance of
animal research.
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APPENDIX N:

STUDY 3

KNOWLEDGE QUIZ (A )

1. List two arguments which support the legalization of drugs.

2. Name three harmful effects of illegal drugs.

KNOWLEDGE QUIZ (B )

1. Name three harmful side effects of illegal drugs.

2. List two arguments which support the legalization of drugs.
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